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The Legalization of Truth in International Fact-Finding
Shiri Krebs

Abstract
Do legal judgments influence people’s attitudes and beliefs concerning contested events? This
Article builds on studies from three disciplines—law, psychology, and political science—and
employs experimental methods to shed light on the impact of legal institutions on their intended
audiences. The Article identifies a rising “legalization of truth” phenomenon—the adoption of
legal discourse to construct and interpret facts outside the courthouse. It argues that legal truth,
while providing a framework of legal terminology and conventions to analyze and understand
facts, comes with a price tag: it triggers cognitive and emotional biases that frustrate efforts to
disseminate controversial information and to resolve factual disputes; and it lacks the emotional
appeal, participatory value, and social cues that moral expressions or other types of social truthtelling entail.
To demonstrate the legalization of truth process and to measure its impact on attitudes
and beliefs, this Article focuses on the practice of international fact-finding. In recent years,
international fact-finding has become a dominant response to armed conflicts and political violence
around the world. Lacking compulsory jurisdiction, international fact-finding bodies have adopted
legal discourse, assuming that legal reports uniformly inform the relevant publics with an
authoritative account of what happened and motivate domestic sanctioning of in-group offenders.
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This Article challenges both assumptions. Based on two survey-experiments fielded in
2013 and 2014 on representative samples of 1,000 and 2,000 U.S. nationals, respectively, as
well as on an original dataset of U.N. fact-finding missions, the study demonstrates that three
elements of legal discourse—binary legal judgment, “hot” legal terminology, and legal frame—
harm the perceived credibility and persuasive value of fact-finding reports: the legal judgment of
the fact-finding report is likely to trigger cognitive biases and belief polarization; “hot” legal
terminology is likely to trigger emotional biases and reduce the perceived fairness of the report;
and the legal frame appears to be less effective than moral frame in influencing attitudes on
accountability.
This Article concludes that international and domestic organizations should rethink their
current design and practice of fact-finding bodies, acknowledge the limitations of adopting a legal
discourse to interpret facts, and recognize the questionable efficacy of legal fact-finding in
influencing attitudes and beliefs. Accordingly, the goals, structures, and processes of fact-finding
should be reorganized, matching goals with appropriate structures and processes. By revealing the
impact of the legalization of truth on people’s beliefs and attitudes, this Article creates a new
framework to understand the failures and successes of legal fact-finding in particular and the
practice and output of legal institutions more broadly.
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Write it down. Write it. With ordinary ink
on ordinary paper; they weren’t given food,
they all died of hunger. All. How many?
It’s a large meadow. How much grass per head?
Write it down: I don’t know.1
***
[A] mechanism was devised for doing nothing at all. It
took the form of a fact-finding mission—the standard device for
diplomats signaling that inaction is the desired outcome.2

I. I NTRODUCTIO N
October 3, 2015, 2:08 A.M.: a U.S. Special Operations AC-130 gunship
attacked a Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, “MSF”) hospital in
Kunduz, Afghanistan, with heavy fire. Forty-two people were killed—mostly
patients and hospital staff members. Dozens of others were injured. The main
hospital building—the only free trauma-care hospital in northern Afghanistan—
was severely damaged and subsequently closed. In the aftermath of the attack on
the hospital, many international organizations, including MSF and various bodies
of the U.N., called for an international fact-finding investigation to establish the
truth and to bring those responsible to justice.3
In the days and months following the attack, several investigations were
carried out by the U.S. military, NATO, the U.N. Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA), and MSF.4 Seven months and four fact-finding reports
1

2
3

4

WISLAWA SZYMBORSKA, Starvation Camp Near Jaslo, in MIRACLE FAIR: SELECTED POEMS
WISLAWA SZYMBORSKA 38 (Joanna Trzeciak trans., 2001).
HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 286–87 (1995).

OF

For example, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon strongly condemned the airstrike and called
for a “thorough and impartial investigation into the attack in order to ensure accountability.”
Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on attack in Kunduz, U.N. (Oct. 3, 2015),
https://perma.cc/KE8E-HZ2P. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights demanded an
investigation and suggested that the attack may amount to a war crime. Kunduz hospital airstrikes
“inexcusable”—Zeid, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Oct. 3, 2015),
https://perma.cc/G9J6-W355. Human Rights Watch called the U.S. to establish “an independent
panel outside the military chain of command with the aim of establishing the facts and assessing
possible culpability for the strike.” Afghanistan: US Inquiry Must Go Past Admitting Mistakes, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/72HH-SWNL. And Doctors Without Borders
demanded a “transparent and independent investigation.” Alissa J. Rubin, Doctors Without Borders
Says It Is Leaving Kunduz After Strike on Hospital, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/Z5225BDU.
U. S. Central Command [Centcom], Summary of the Airstrike on the MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz,
Afghanistan on October 3, 2015; Investigation and Follow-on Actions (Apr. 2016), https://perma.cc/RF6C-
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later, one thing became certain: uncertainty surrounded almost every aspect of the
attack and its consequences.5 Due to MSF’s high profile, its international network,
and the apparent unlawfulness of striking a functioning hospital, investigating the
attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz had a strong potential to produce
transparent, consistent, and credible findings. Yet instead of settling the dispute
over what happened, the four reports only refined the controversies and exposed
the inherent disbelief and mistrust between different organizations and
communities. The factual findings reported by UNAMA were challenged by
counter-facts produced in the U.S. Central Command Report, and at the end each
side remained committed to its own version of the truth.6 Even basic facts, such
XS72 [hereinafter Centcom Report]; NATO, Executive Summary: Combined Civilian Casualty
[CIVCAS] Assessment of an Airstrike on a Medical Facility in Kunduz City on 03 October 2015 (Nov. 2015),
https://perma.cc/8WEL-6CF2 [hereinafter NATO Report]; U.N. Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan, Human Rights and Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Special Report on Kunduz Province
(Dec. 2015), https://perma.cc/WUB6-6F3G [hereinafter UNAMA Report]; Doctors Without
Borders, Initial MSF Internal Review: Attack on Kunduz Trauma Centre, Afghanistan (Nov. 2015),
https://perma.cc/CZZ6-PRR9 [hereinafter MSF Report].
5

6

See UNAMA published its Special Report on Kunduz in December 2015. UNAMA Report, supra
note 4. The report adopted the findings elaborated in the MSF Report, concluding that the attack
on the hospital lasted about an hour, from 2:07 a.m. until 3:00 or 3:15 a.m., continuing for at least
40 minutes after the hospital personnel first contacted U.S. authorities in Afghanistan, at 2:19 a.m.,
informing them that the hospital was under fire. Id. at 7–8; MSF Report, supra note 4, at 7–8. The
UNAMA Report concluded that the attack possibly amounted to a war crime—the conclusions
were not final. MSF Report, supra note 4, at 12. A few months later, in April 2016, the U.S. Central
Command published its own report, following a thorough internal investigation. Centcom Report,
supra note 4. The Centcom Report produced counter-facts, concluding that the attack lasted only
30 minutes, from 2:08 a.m. until 2:38 a.m. and that the “tragic errors” that led to the attack on the
hospital did not amount to a “war crime.” Id. at 3. Moreover, the Centcom Report, like its NATO
twin, left many factual questions undecided: it was unable to conclusively determine how many
people were killed in the attack (emphasizing it was unable to verify the numbers provided by
Doctors Without Borders), or what caused the series of errors that led to the hour-long attack on
the trauma center, other than the ‘fog of war.’ Id. at 2–3. The Centcom Report embraced the
uncertainty encountered during combat operations as the main factor contributing to the tragic
course of events. See id. Based on these counter-facts, the U.S. military adopted administrative and
disciplinary measures against the sixteen individuals who were identified as responsible for the
errors. Id. at 4.
Both UNAMA and MSF expressed an inherent disbelief in the findings of the military
investigations. See UNAMA Report, supra note 4, at 12; DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, Initial
Reaction from MSF to Public Release of US Military Investigative Report on the Attack on MSF Trauma Hospital
in Kunduz, Afghanistan, (Apr. 2016), https://perma.cc/T2EP-UMT3. The UNAMA report explicitly
criticized both Centcom and NATO investigations for their lack of independence and effectiveness.
UNAMA Report, supra note 4, at 12. The U.S. and NATO fact-finding reports seemed coordinated,
using almost identical words to describe their identical conclusions. For example, the NATO report
concluded that the attack on the hospital resulted from a “series of human errors, compounded by
failures of process and procedure, and malfunctions of technical equipment,” NATO Report, supra
note 4, at 1, while the Centcom Report concluded, similarly, that the attack resulted from a
“combination of human errors, compounded by process and equipment failures,” Centcom Report,
supra note 4, at 1. Therefore, the UNAMA Report called to establish another independent, impartial,
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as the time frame of the attack, were just as contested as the sophisticated legal
analysis.7 This served as a fertile ground for law professors, legal scholars, and
practitioners to further the debates and to intensify and highlight the
disagreements over the legal analysis of the applicable norms.8
To close this gap, both MSF and UNAMA reiterated their demand to
establish an international fact-finding mission to investigate the incident.9 The
repeated and uniform calls for an international investigation—whether by the
International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission (“IHFFC”) or some other
ad-hoc mechanism—are not surprising. In recent years, international fact-finding
has become a dominant response to many crises around the world.10 Since the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the U.N. alone has dispatched forty-eight
fact-finding missions,11 tasked with establishing the legal facts by documenting
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.12 Lacking
compulsory jurisdiction, the fundamental goal of these missions is to persuade
prompt, transparent, and effective investigation of the attack against the hospital. UNAMA Report,
supra note 4 at 12.
7

8

9

10
11

12

The UNAMA Report concluded that the attack on the hospital lasted about an hour, from 2:07
a.m. until 3:00 or 3:15 a.m. UNAMA Report, supra note 4 at 7–8. The Centcom Report determined
that the attack lasted only 30 minutes, from 2:08 a.m. until 2:38 a.m. Id. at 3.
See, for example, Peter Margulies, Centcom Report on the Kunduz Hospital Attack: Accounting for a Tragedy
of Errors, LAWFARE (May 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/9QXH-U6YV; Alex Whiting, Recklessness, War
Crimes, and the Kunduz Hospital Bombing, JUST SECURITY (May 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/YN5VSU4A; Jonathan Horowitz, Why the US Should Cooperate With Investigations Into the Hospital Bombing,
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/BU8Y-LKPU; Jens David Ohlin, Was the Kunduz
Hospital Attack a War Crime?, OPINIO JURIS (May 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/YE99-854K; Kevin
Jon Heller, Thoughts on Jens’s Post About the Kunduz Attack, OPINIO JURIS, (May 3, 2016),
https://perma.cc/GJ7U-ZFGW.
MSF specifically demanded an international investigation by the International Humanitarian FactFinding Commission (IHFFC). DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, Kunduz: Initial Reaction to Public
Release of U.S. Military Investigative Report on the Attack on MSF Trauma Hospital (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://perma.cc/285C-99RF; see also Eve Bring, The Kunduz Hospital Attack: The Existence of a FactFinding Commission, EJIL TALK! (Oct. 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/8BHT-7JUN (encouraging the
international community to turn to the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission to
investigate this—and other—events). UNAMA required an independent, impartial, prompt,
transparent, and effective investigation. See UNAMA Report, supra note 4, at 12.
See Section II(A) infra, including the data summarized in figure 1.
This data is based on qualitative information available at the United Nations Library; quantitative
analysis of the data is my own. International Commissions of Inquiry, Fact-Finding Missions: Europe, U.N.
LIBRARY, https://perma.cc/39FB-8AZQ.
G.A. RES. A/RES/46/59, Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Dec. 9, 1991). For an elaborate account of U.N.
fact-finding missions throughout the years, see Section II(A), infra. For a brief overview of factfinding mechanisms established by the international community since 1913, see Rob Grace
& Claude Bruderlein, Building Effective Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-finding Mechanisms 3–9 (Apr. 12,
2012), https://perma.cc/FUE4-M5J8.
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relevant audiences to accept their findings and adopt their recommendations. The
assumptions underlying these efforts are that legal fact-finding bodies are wellsuited to settle disputes over “what happened,” and that by producing credible
facts, their findings and conclusions will mobilize domestic accountability
measures.
This Article challenges both assumptions. It argues that legal fact-finding,
while providing a framework of legal conventions and social discourse to analyze
and understand facts, comes with a price tag: the binary legal judgment is likely to
trigger cognitive biases and belief polarization; “hot” legal terminology (such as
“war crimes”) is likely to trigger emotional biases and reduce the perceived fairness
of the report; and the overall legal frame is less likely than other social frames
(such as moral frames) to influence attitudes on accountability and mobilize public
support, both to prosecute in-group offenders and to compensate out-group
victims. Therefore, legal discourse may not be an optimal choice for influencing
attitudes and beliefs concerning contested events. This price is particularly
detrimental for international fact-finding because, in contrast to international
tribunals, international fact-finding bodies suffer from an enforcement deficit and
are therefore designed to influence their intended audiences through soft power,
dialogue, and persuasion. While MSF understandably desires to find the truth
about what happened the day of the attack on their hospital—and to punish those
responsible—this Article suggests that yet another legal fact-finding report is
probably not what is needed to resolve the controversy and mobilize sanctioning.13
Indeed, international fact-finding missions have often been at the center of
intense controversies about alleged atrocities and abuses.14 The Rwandan reaction
to the 2010 Democratic Republic of the Congo Report (“dangerous and
irresponsible”),15 and the Israeli response to the 2009 Gaza Report (“false” and
“distorted”),16 are merely two recent examples of the heated controversies
13

I will elaborate on potential alternatives to current legal fact-finding strategies, such as a “learning
from failure” approach, in Section VI, infra.

14

See Philip Alston & Sarah Knuckey, The Transformation of Human-Rights Fact-Finding: Challenges and
Opportunities, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING 3 (Philip Alston & Sarah
Knuckey eds., 2016). In a recent U.N. publication, the High Commissioner for Human Rights
welcomed such controversies as “publicity,” and argued that they increase the public profile of the
investigations and thus highlight the important role of the investigations in promoting
accountability. See Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), Commissions
of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
Guidance and Practice, at 7, HR/PUB/14/7 (2015), https://perma.cc/NRR6-5YTR [hereinafter
UNHCHR Fact-Finding Guidance].
Statement by the Government of Rwanda on Leaked Draft UN report on DRC, RWANDA NEWS AGENCY
(Aug. 27, 2010), https://perma.cc/6T2Z-6A34.
Barak: Goldstone Report “False, Distorted, and Irresponsible,” HAARETZ (Jan. 28, 2010),
https://perma.cc/T8PJ-RSJX.

15

16
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generated by the release of many U.N. fact-finding reports.17 Analyzing public
opinion polls in the former Yugoslavia, Marko Milanovic revealed that factual
controversies continue to thrive even when the factual determinations are made
by a competent court, whose judgments are binding and final.18 While the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) prides itself in
“creating a historical record, combatting denial and preventing attempts at
revisionism,”19 Milanovic demonstrated that denialism is thriving, that each ethnic
group in the former Yugoslavia is still firmly attached to its own version of history,
and that the tribunal failed to persuade the relevant target populations that the
findings in its judgments are true.20 Nonetheless, as Milanovic points out, the
Yugoslav surveys do not provide us with a direct measure of any impact that ICTY
has had on people’s attitudes about crimes in the Yugoslav wars, or what the
situation would look like had the ICTY done things differently. 21 He concludes,
therefore, that “the best thing we can do is speculate, if in an informed way.”22
This Article takes a different methodological approach—one that obviates
the need to speculate. It complements existing observational studies by leveraging
the use of experiments embedded in a pair of U.S. national surveys. Using surveyexperiments, this Article provides systematic evidence of the consequences of
international fact-finding reports on people’s attitudes and beliefs.23 It directly
measures individuals’ reactions to both positive and negative information
(sanctioning or absolving in-group members); different legal terminologies
(“cold” violations terminology versus “hot” war crimes terminology); and
different frames (legal frame versus moral frame). Based on these components of
legal fact-finding reports—judgment, terminology, and frame—the Article
demonstrates how cognitive and emotional biases influence people’s reactions to
new information about war crimes committed by their fellow nationals. There are

17

18

19

20
21
22
23

Following the release of the 2009 Goldstone Report, an Israeli public opinion poll found that 93.5%
of Jewish Israelis believed the report was biased against Israel. Efraim Ya’ar & Tamar Herman, Peace
Index - September 2009 (2009), https://perma.cc/HJ2J-5AQ2.
Marko Milanovic, The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Post-Mortem, 110 AM.
J. INT’L L. 233, 256–58 (2016).
U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Achievements,
https://perma.cc/46M8-FCBP.
See Milanovic, supra note 18, at 256–58.
Id. at 254–45.
Id. at 258.
In a recent article, Tomer Broude made the case for behavioral analysis of international law,
suggesting that a behavioral approach can contribute to international legal research by raising
interesting hypotheses relating to problems in international law, and by providing frameworks for
experimental testing of these hypotheses, with both explanatory and normative implications. See
Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2015).
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a number of benefits to this approach. Querying mass publics also allows me to
examine more directly the impact of “doing things differently”—of various
framings, processes, and institutional designs––on willingness to believe
threatening facts. Additionally, using an experimental design minimizes problems
posed by selection effects that characterize much of the existing research on
international law and institutions.24 And lastly, focusing on the social impact of
international fact-finding is especially instructive, because, unlike the ICTY and
similar tribunals, fact-finding missions do not give binding judgments or decisions,
and their main contribution is disseminating facts and making recommendations
through otherwise unenforceable reports.
The two experiments discussed in this Article were fielded in 2013 and 2014
on representative samples of 1,000 and 2,000 U.S. nationals, respectively. The
findings demonstrate that international fact-finding reports on war crimes
committed by U.S. Marines in Afghanistan are ineffective in both (i) resolving
controversies in the U.S. over contested events; and in (ii) motivating domestic
condemnation of U.S. war criminals. Additionally, I find that a moral discourse is
more effective than a legal discourse in influencing attitudes on sanctioning and
mobilizing public support to prosecute U.S. war criminals and to compensate
Afghan victims.
Based on these findings, I conclude that international organizations,
including the U.N., should rethink their current design and practice of
international fact-finding, acknowledge the limitations of adopting a legal
discourse to interpret facts, and recognize the questionable efficacy of legal factfinding in influencing attitudes and beliefs. Accordingly, the goals, structures, and
processes of international fact-finding should be reorganized, matching goals with
appropriate structures and processes. For example, if the main goal of a factfinding mission is legal accountability, a court-like structure, complete with
enforcement powers, is advisable. If, however, conflict resolution is the primary
goal, a narrative or restorative approach to truth, through a social process of truth
and reconciliation, is preferable. Ultimately, international fact-finding, in its
current form, carries mainly institutional and social disadvantages.
While these findings have concrete implications for the design and practice
of international fact-finding bodies, they also have broader significance
concerning the impact of legal institutions––international or domestic––on their
intended audiences, and on the role of legal discourse in shaping attitudes and

24

See generally Adam S. Chilton & Dustin H. Tingley, Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments,
52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173 (2013). For a similar approach, see generally Geoffrey P.R.
Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG.
105 (2013).
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beliefs.25 The “legalization of truth” process I identify in this Article characterizes
not only the discourse adopted by international organizations, but also the
discourse adopted by many human rights organizations, social movements, and
domestic institutions. From police violence to sexual harassment to torture, the
most burning social controversies of our time have been analyzed in the social
sphere through legal lenses, using legal discourse, including binary legal judgment,
legal terminology and legal frames. However, this Article demonstrates that the
popularity of legal discourse in fact-finding efforts is probably unjustified and
might be counter-productive. By revealing the impact of legal discourse on
people’s beliefs and attitudes, this Article creates a new framework to understand
the failures and successes of legal fact-finding in particular and the practice and
output of legal institutions more broadly.
The Article begins, in Section II, with an interdisciplinary theoretical
framework on the legalization of truth in international fact-finding. This Section
combines legal scholarship on war crimes investigations, fact-finding, and legal
discourse with social-psychology literature on selective information processing,
cognitive and emotional biases, attitude formation, and persuasion; and political
science literature on ideological bias and the efficacy of fact-finding reports.
Additionally, this Section presents data from an original dataset of U.N. factfinding missions, including their mandates and goals. Based on this rich literature
and data, I develop my argument and present my hypotheses about how the
legalization of truth in international fact-finding influences attitudes and beliefs.
Sections III and IV present the design of the two experiments and report their
findings. Section V then discusses how these findings contribute to our
understanding of legal discourse’s impact on attitudes and beliefs; and Section VI
offers several recommendations for how to design fact-finding bodies, including
rethinking their goals and adopting alternative structures to promote
accountability.

II. T HE L EGALIZATION OF T RUTH : T HEORY
AND H YPOTHESES
The “legalization of truth” process refers to the adoption of legal discourse to
construct and interpret facts. Discourse is the foundation of the process of social
construction upon which social reality depends. It relates to the practices of talking
25

In a future paper, When More Information Means Less Knowledge: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S.,
Canada and Israel (work-in-progress), I will test the generalizability of these findings to other
societies, including Canada and Israel. This forthcoming paper will report the results of experiments
fielded in Israel and Canada in 2016. These comparative experiments—replicating the U.S.
experiments, with the necessary changes––will enable me to compare the impact of international
fact-finding reports on factual beliefs and attitudes in different societies.
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and writing, which produce reality or “truth” through the production,
dissemination, and consumption of texts.26 Legal discourse is a socially
institutionalized meaning-making process that dictates meanings, interpretations,
and ideological preferences through a variety of compositional, stylistic, and
semantic mechanisms.27 It influences perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs through a
commitment, among other things, to binary legal judgments, to the closure of
controversies, to one true meaning of texts, and to legal rhetoric, terminology, and
voice.28
This Article examines the social outcomes of the prevailing legal discourse
in international fact-finding. To operationalize legal discourse and measure its
unique influence on social attitudes and beliefs, I focus on three distinct
dimensions of legal discourse that are present in most fact-finding reports: binary
judgments (incriminating or absolving), legal terminology or semantics (“war
crimes” versus “violations”), and legal frame (referring specifically to “law” or
“legal standards,” rather than, for example, “moral standards”). This Article
argues that under some circumstances, the adoption of legal discourse to produce
facts and create meaning may elicit not assent but, instead, distrust, resistance, and
distortion.29 In the following Sections I lay out my argument concerning the
distinctive—and sometimes negative––social impact of legal discourse. First, I
describe the institutionalization of legal discourse in international fact-finding
efforts. Second, I discuss the theoretical foundations of this argument, focusing
on two of the main weaknesses of legal discourse: its limited ability to resolve
social controversies and disseminate contested information, and its bounded
efficacy in influencing social attitudes and mobilizing people for action.

A. Legal Fact-Finding as an International Strategy
From Palestine to Lebanon, to Darfur and to Libya; from Georgia to
Ukraine, to Serbia and to Sri Lanka, one of the most certain facts about conflicts
is uncertainty about facts.30 The disagreement about facts may include the history
and roots of the conflict, as well as details concerning ongoing hostilities. Often,
26

Cynthia Hardy, Researching Organizational Discourse, 31 INT’L STUD. MGMT. & ORG. 25, 26–27 (2001).

27

PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
169–70, 203–204 (1987).

28

See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1551–53
(1990).

29

Id. at 1546 (suggesting that lawyers’ style of argument is not uniformly effective).
Bothe, for example, highlights the importance of ascertaining facts in the context of all kinds of
conflicts, be they of a social, political, or legal character. Michael Bothe, Fact-finding as a Means of
Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING
NEW CHALLENGES 249, 249–67 (Wolff Heintschel Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007).
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disputes over facts become so intense they nourish and intensify the conflict,31
and thus pave the way for further crimes and abuses.32
For decades, the international community has been struggling to find
constructive methods to stop such abuses and to promote justice and
accountability.33 One of the most important and common strategies adopted by
many international organizations (including U.N. bodies, such as the Security
Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, the SecretaryGeneral, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights) is international factfinding.34 For instance, in 1991 the U.N. General Assembly signed the Declaration
on Fact-finding by the U.N. in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace
and Security, urging U.N. organs to undertake fact-finding activities and to obtain
detailed knowledge about the factual circumstances of any dispute in order to
maintain international peace and security.35
To provide a complete analysis and identify the legalization of truth in U.N.
fact-finding missions, I compiled an original dataset that includes all U.N. factfinding missions from 1945 to 2015. The coding scheme includes the year the factfinding mission was created (or its mandate was revised); the U.N. organ
establishing the mission; the countries subject to investigation; and the declared
goals of the mission (including investigating violations of international law,
promoting accountability, assisting domestic authorities, promoting
reconciliation, preventing future atrocities, determining facts, and ascertaining the
truth). The dataset is based on information that is available online at the U.N.
Library in dozens of previously unorganized and understudied documents,
including U.N. resolutions, reports, and decisions. The following paragraphs
introduce the main findings of this analysis.
Throughout its history, the U.N., through its various organs, has established
sixty-six fact-finding missions. Of these sixty-six missions, thirty-eight (57
percent) were established in the last decade. The U.N. Human Rights Council
31

32

For a detailed discussion of the disagreement over facts as a socio-psychological barrier to conflict
resolution, see Suzanne Retzinger & Thomas Scheff, Emotion, Alienation, and Narratives: Resolving
Intractable Conflict, 18 MEDIATION Q. 71 (2000); Peter T. Coleman, Characteristics of Protracted,
Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a Metaframework-I, 9 PEACE & CONFLICT 1, 19 (2003).
For a comprehensive analysis of the preservation of conflicting narratives and beliefs in intractable
conflict, see Daniel Bar-Tal, Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts, 50 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1430 (2007); see also Neta Oren & Daniel Bar-Tal, The Detrimental Dynamics of
Delegitimization in Intractable Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case, 31 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 111
(2007).

34

This Article does not deal with the few international mechanisms which enjoy mandatory
jurisdiction and enforcement power, but only with voluntary fact-finding mechanisms that depend
on states’ cooperation.
UNHCHR Fact-Finding Guidance, supra note 14, at 2; see also supra notes 1–5.

35

G.A. Res. A/RES/46/59, supra note 12.
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(UNHRC), a U.N. organ established in 2006, is responsible for the establishment
of twenty-nine (44 percent) of these sixty-six missions; UNHRC missions
comprise 76 percent of the missions established in the last decade. Overall, about
half of all missions were sent to investigate atrocities in Africa, and the other half
concentrated in Asia and the Pacific. Four missions were tasked with investigating
atrocities in the Americas and one was established to investigate atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia.36
Figure 1. U.N. Fact-Finding Missions, by Decade
Number of Fact-Finding Missions
Established by UN Organs, by Decades
38
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In recent decades, the variety of fact-finding mechanisms has tremendously
expanded, not only in numbers, but also in mandates, capacities, institutional
affiliations, and goals.37 Nonetheless, while the 1991 General Assembly resolution
defined fact-finding in terms of “obtain[ing] detailed knowledge of the relevant
facts,”38 most U.N. fact-finding missions were not created to fulfill the goal of
ascertaining facts alone. Instead, these fact-finding missions were specifically
tasked with other goals, such as determining state and individual responsibility for
violations of international law, making recommendations regarding reform and

36

This data is based on qualitative information available at the United Nations Library; quantitative
analysis of the data is my own. International Commissions of Inquiry, Fact-Finding Missions: Europe, U.N.
LIBRARY, https://perma.cc/39FB-8AZQ.

37

For a brief overview of fact-finding mechanisms established by the international community since
1913, see Grace & Bruderlein, supra note 12, at 2–9.

38

G.A. Res. A/RES/46/59, supra note 12.
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reparations, and promoting accountability.39 The mandate of the most recent
UNHCR fact-finding mission––the Burundi Mission––does not even mention
ascertaining facts as one of its purposes. Instead, it focuses on long-term goals
such as preventing further deterioration of the human rights situation, making
legal determinations on possible violations of international law, assisting the state
to fulfill its human rights obligations, and ensuring accountability for human rights
violations and abuses.40
Analyzing the mandates of these sixty-six fact-finding missions, I found that
an overwhelming majority of these missions––95 percent––were established to
investigate alleged violations of international law, and requested that the mission
members rely on legal norms in their analysis and adopt legal discourse in the
description of their findings. Half of those missions were specifically instructed to
further the goal of accountability. Of the thirty-eight missions established after
2006, twenty-four (63 percent) were specifically tasked with the goal of promoting
accountability, while of the twenty-eight missions established prior to 2006, only
nine (32 percent) were instructed to focus on accountability. Additionally, of the
sixty-six U.N. fact-finding missions, three (4 percent) were instructed to promote
the goal of reconciliation; three (4 percent) were instructed to assist domestic
authorities; and only one (1 percent) had the goal of preventing future atrocities.
Of the sixty-six fact-finding missions, only seventeen (25 percent) mandates
included reference to “fact-finding” in their mandate, and the mandate of only
one mission included reference to ascertaining the “truth.”41 It is clear from this
data that the past decade has brought a meaningful rise not only in the number of
fact-finding missions, but also in the adoption of legal discourse and concrete legal

39

Specifically, these goals include assessing the truth of allegations made; preparing reports designed
for “name and shame” advocacy or as a basis for future litigation; constructing a historical record;
and making recommendations to prevent future abuse. Alston & Knuckey, supra note 14, at 9.

40

UNHRC Res. A/HRC/RES/S-24/1, Preventing the Deterioration of the Human Rights Situation
in Burundi (Dec. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/HN7J-RC8S.

41

See Appendix IX(1) for the full dataset of U.N. fact-finding mission goals.
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goals such as accountability.42 The data further suggest that the process of
establishing fact-finding missions reproduces the “legalization of truth” approach
to fact-finding and a commitment to legal discourse without questioning its
efficacy and without considering alternatives.43
This legalization of truth in U.N. fact-finding missions echoes the “naming
and shaming” strategy adopted by many non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).44 “Naming and shaming” is a fact-finding process designed specifically
for the goal of exposing concrete violations of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law (naming), and publicizing this information to
condemn the relevant societies (shaming), in the hope that the international
condemnation will pressure the relevant societies to stop the abuses and bring the
offenders to justice.45 Fact-finding efforts designed to “name and shame” abusive
42

43

44

45

The qualitative data further demonstrate the nature of this legalization of truth. For example, the
language of the UNHRC resolution mandating a fact-finding mission in Burundi extended the
mission’s mandate to investigate “violations and abuses of human rights,” UNHRC Res. S-24/1,
supra note 40, ¶ 17(a). Other recent examples are the Security Council fact-finding mission to the
DRC, which defined the mission’s mandate as “a mapping of the serious violations committed,”
S.C. Res. S-2006/390, ¶ 54 (June 13, 2006); and the mandate of the 2009 Gaza mission, which
called to “investigate all violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law,” UNHRC Res. A/HRC/S-9/1, 153–56. See also G.A. Res. A/RES/68/165, ¶ 1,
(Dec. 18, 2013) (stating that the organization “recognizes the importance of respecting and
ensuring the right to the truth so as to contribute to ending impunity and to promote and protect
human rights”); UNHRC Res. A/HRC/RES/14/7, Proclamation of 24 March as the
International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for
the Dignity of Victims (June 23, 2010); Frédéric Mégret, Do Facts Exist, Can They Be “Found”, and
Does It Matter?, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING, supra note 14, at 34.
For an elaborate criticism of the design process of international fact-finding mechanisms, see Q.C.
Palmer, Reform of UN Inquiries, in FOR THE SAKE OF FUTURE GENERATIONS—ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN HONOUR OF ROGER S. CLARK 597, 607–15 (2015).
See also Grace & Bruderlein, supra note 12 (calling on the international community to adopt a more
systematic and informed process for establishing fact-finding mechanisms).
For example, Human Rights Watch declares that its mission is to “investigate abuses, expose the
facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice,” About, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, https://perma.cc/7SEQ-A7PH, and states that the organization’s founding
strategy was to adopt “a methodology of publicly ‘naming and shaming’ abusive governments
through media coverage and through direct exchanges with policymakers,” Our History, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, https://perma.cc/5D28-CFSW. See also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and
Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689 (2008); Suzanne
Katzenstein, Reverse-Rhetorical Entrapment: Naming and Shaming as a Two-Way Street, 46 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1079 (2013).
See Amanda M. Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact
of Human Rights INGOs, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 56 (2012); Katzenstein, supra note 44, at 1079; see, also,
Michael Kirby and Sandeep Gopalan, Recalcitrant States and International Law: The Role of the UN
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 37 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 229, 274-288 (2015) (discussing both objections to and advantages of international
shaming).
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regimes typically convey their messages through legalized fact-finding reports,
concluding with semi-judicial determinations that international law was (or was
not) violated. There are various theories explaining why “naming and shaming”
works,46 but all rest on two fundamental assumptions: (a) that fact-finding reports
resolve factual controversies concerning “what happened” (which I refer to as the
“credibility assumption”);47 and (b) that publicizing these reports pressures the
relevant societies to stop the abuses and sanction the offenders (which I refer to
as the “mobilization assumption”).48
While the legal literature on the effects of fact-finding is underdeveloped,49
political science scholars have examined its efficacy through various quantitative
and qualitative methods. The data is mixed: while some scholars (and many
international organizations) believe that fact-finding leads to decreased violations
and promotes justice and accountability,50 others argue that this strategy may
prove to be counter-productive and prevent political compromises that could
otherwise lead to peace and stability.51 The debate is far from settled,52 and some
scholars find that the answer is complex, and that the efficacy of this strategy
depends upon many domestic and international factors, including the type of

46

Matthew Krain, J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or
Politicides?, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 574 (2012); James C. Franklin, Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights
Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 187 (2008).

47

Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz empirically tested and confirmed the hypothesis that Human Rights
Organizations [HROs] are powerful conduits through which a population becomes informed of
domestic human rights issues. David R. Davis, Amanda Murdie & Coty Garnett Steinmetz, ‘Makers
and Shapers’: Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 199 (2012). More generally,
Wallace summarizes the literature on the ‘educational role’ of international law as a tool to
communicate messages to individuals. Wallace, supra note 24, at 111. See also Krain, supra note 46.

48

Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt, International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming
Save Lives?, 38 INT’L INTERACTIONS 597 (2012); Krain, supra note 46.

49

In recent years, a scholarly literature describing and analyzing international fact-finding has
developed steadily. Nonetheless, as Alston and Knuckey rightly identify, the vast majority of these
studies are either essentially descriptive or largely uncritical. Alston & Knuckey, supra note 14, at
4.

50

See, for example, Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms
into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 5 (Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999); E. M.
Hafner-Burton & K. Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110
AM. J. SOC. 1373 (2005).
See, for example, Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies
of International Justice, 28 INT’L SEC. 5, 6 (2004); Franklin, supra note 46, at 187 (presenting a more
nuanced argument and claiming that the positive impact of naming and blaming is temporary).
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See Katzenstein, supra note 44, at 1080–81.
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shamed regime,53 the type of abuses,54 and the identity of the condemning body.55
Additionally, existing data is limited in scope and focuses on the impact of naming
and shaming on governments and elites, or on levels of violence and abuses. 56
Very little work has been done to test the impact of fact-finding reports on the
investigated societies more broadly or to directly examine either the credibility or
mobilization assumptions.
No doubt it is important to pressure governments and oppressive regimes
directly (especially when dealing with non-democratic regimes). Nonetheless, the
international community should acknowledge the fact that some of the countries
that engage in activities that violate international law are democracies, and that
public opinion in those countries is important for their collaboration with nonbinding international reports and institutions. In various studies, political scientists
have demonstrated that public opinion affects policy in a variety of fields, and that
such influence is well-maintained even in the face of activities by interest
organizations, political parties, and political and economic elites.57 Moreover, the
focus on governments and elites misses one of the most important aspects of
international fact-finding: the prospect of providing credible information on
contested events and creating a shared understanding of “what really happened.”
Can fact-finding be considered successful if it triggers more conflict and
disagreements over what happened? Can it be considered effective if it fails to
persuade the perpetrators’ society that offenders should be condemned and
sanctioned?
A recent article by Jacob Ausderan, published by the Journal of Peace Research,
took on the task of empirically testing the impact of “naming and shaming”

53

Anja Jetschke & Andrea Liese, The Power of Human Rights a Decade After: From Euphoria to Contestation?,
in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 26 (Thomas
Risse, Stephen Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2013).

54

Hafner-Burton, supra note 44.
Franklin, supra note 46.

55
56

57

BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
(2009); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006);
Stanley Cohen, Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials, and Counterclaims, 18
HUM. RTS. Q. 517, 518 (1996); DeMeritt, supra note 43; Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, supra note
51.
Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 175,
175–90 (1983); Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda, 56
POL. RES. Q. 29, 29 (2003). For a comprehensive survey of the impact of public opinion on decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court, see Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the
Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263 (2010). Broude offers
several additional explanations for the significance of individuals in international law research,
focusing on individuals’ roles as both subjects of and decision-makers in international law. Broude,
supra note 23, at 1129–30.
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strategies on individuals.58 Ausderan concluded that after being exposed to
negative information on abuses conducted by their governments, individuals
updated their beliefs accordingly to reflect more negative attitudes.59 In other
words, as expected by proponents of the “naming and shaming” strategy, more
information means more shared knowledge. Ausderan, however, acknowledged the
potential of positive reaction to negative information, and admitted that further
research is necessary to shed more light on this issue.60 Additionally, this main
effect, which was detected by his analysis of observational data (limited in its
ability to constitute a direct test of the causal mechanism––that perceptions are
affected by individual exposure to naming and shaming reports), was not
supported by the results of his experimental data, which were statistically
insignificant.61 Finally, the article did not test directly either one of the
fundamental assumptions underlying the naming and shaming strategy: the
credibility assumption and the mobilization assumption.62
This Article takes on this challenge. It tests both the credibility and
mobilization assumptions underlying international fact-finding efforts, and
provides data that reveal how people process and respond to new information
concerning war crimes committed by their fellow nationals. It directly tests
individuals’ reactions to both positive and negative information, and demonstrates
how ideological beliefs and political commitments influence people’s reactions to
new information about war crimes. As a first step, this Article begins with the U.S.
and uses the war in Afghanistan as its context. In a separate article, I will present
comparative evidence on the impact of legalization of truth on attitudes and
beliefs in the U.S., Israel, and Canada.

58

59
60
61
62

Jacob Ausderan, How Naming and Shaming Affects Human Rights Perceptions in the Shamed Country, 51 J.
PEACE RES. 81 (2014).
Id. at 81.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 89–93.
In a comprehensive article surveying the literature on credibility and persuasion, Chanthika
Pornpitakpan highlights the need for studies that investigate the effect of negative initial
dispositions on perceived credibility of new information and persuasion. Chanthika Pornpitakpan,
The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A Critical Review of Five Decades' Evidence, 34 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 243, 270 (2004).
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B. Challenging the Credibility Assumption: More Information,
More Bias
Fact-finding is defined as a way to ascertain facts by gathering immediate,
credible, and first-hand information.63 The credibility of a fact-finding report is
therefore a central part of its core definition, and it encompasses its
methodology,64 resourses,65 and personnel.66
International fact-finding rests on the basic assumption that more
information means more credible––and thus shared––knowledge, and that by
disseminating their findings, fact-finding missions combat denial and resolve
controversies concerning disputed facts.67 Fact-finders are regarded as “the eyes
and ears” of the relevant communities,68 and there is a sense that “the report
speaks for itself.”69 However, facts very rarely speak for themselves. In his book,
States of Denial, influential sociologist Stanley Cohen explains how individuals
select information that fits their existing perceptual frames, while information that
is inconsistent with their existing beliefs, or which is too threatening, is shut out
altogether.70 Cohen further develops the concept of interpretive denial, where the
raw facts are accepted, but are given a different meaning from what seems
63

H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 88, 127
(2004); Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE
FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (Bertrand G. Ramcharan ed., 2014).

64

Diane F. Orentlicher, Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding, 3 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 83, 85 (1990); Théo Boutruche, Credible Fact-Finding and Allegations of International Humanitarian
Law Violations: Challenges in Theory and Practice, 16 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 105. (2011).
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 35,
42 (2001).
Ramcharan, supra note 63, at 42. Indeed, with regard to the experience of fact-finding it is
considered that fact-finding requires one to perfect strategies for information gathering,
interpersonal communication, and analysis of both the legal and non-legal dimensions of a
particular socio-legal problem. Johanna Bond, The Global Classroom: International Human Rights FactFinding as Clinical Method, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 317, 328 (2001).

65

66

67

68

The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, emphasized that “[t]he public
nature of these reports is important for them to contribute to the historical recording of events,
strengthen the calls for accountability and promote implementation of the recommendations.”
UNHCHR Fact-Finding Guidance, supra note 14, at 92. Similarly, Christof Heyns, U.N. Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions and member of the U.N.
Independent Investigation on Burundi, stated that “it is crucial to ascertain the disputed facts in an
indisputable manner.” Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Burundi, UNHRC (Mar. 22, 2016),
https://perma.cc/W5ZY-LNRH (follow 22 March 2016 English hyperlink under
“Documentation” heading).
Grace & Bruderlein, supra note 12, at 31.

69

Rob Grace, Communication and Report Drafting in Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-finding Mechanisms, 13
(July 2014), https://perma.cc/H5AV-XP6Q.

70

STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 6 (2013).
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apparent to others.71 In Cohen’s words, “a perceptual filter is placed over reality”
and some knowledge has to be rejected or be given a different meaning.72
The perceived credibility of fact-finding reports may be affected by several
aspects of the reports: its message (the binary legal judgment);73 its terminology
(the legal labels used to describe the relevant behavior, such as “war crimes”);74
and its source (the institution producing the report or establishing the fact-finding
mission, such as the U.N. and its organs, national or transnational NGOs, or
domestic institutions, including militaries).75 As credibility is typically assumed, or
treated as a prerequisite of fact-finding mechanisms, it is rarely discussed or
studied as a dependent variable, influenced by the message content, its language,
delivery, and source.76 Since the fundamental goal of any fact-finding institution is
to produce a credible description of specific events, the thriving legal literature on
international fact-finding could benefit from lessons learned through decades of
intense research on the perceived credibility of new information in other
disciplines, including social psychology, political science, sociology, and
communications.
The following Sections describe cognitive and emotional biases influencing
the assimilation and perceived credibility of new information. These Sections do
not offer a one-size-fits-all social response mechanism, but rather, suggest that
fact-finding reports trigger various cognitive and emotional biases that influence
the way information is being processed and perceived. Additionally, different
biases may have opposite effects on individuals and groups. For example, “hot”
war crimes terminology may trigger defensive reactions and rejection of
information that blames one’s nation with the commission of war crimes, while
those with a more liberal ideology may question anything that looks like an attempt
to whitewash atrocities.

1. Cognitive biases and receptiveness to fact-finding reports.
Research in the fields of social psychology and communication examines
how message characteristics, including structure, content, and language, impact
perceptions of believability of the message.77 Scholars of information processing
have found that the use of opinionated language––which is perceived as
71

Id. at 7–8.

72

Id. at 13.
See infra Section II(B)(1).

73
74
75
76
77

See infra Section II)(B)(2).
See infra Section II(B)(3).
See, for example, UNHCHR Fact-Finding Guidance, supra note 14.
Miriam J. Metzger et al., Credibility for the 21st Century: Integrating Perspectives on Source, Message, and Media
Credibility in the Contemporary Media Environment, 27 COMM. Y.B. 293, 302 (2003).
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domineering and intolerant––can decrease a message’s credibility, depending on
the legitimacy of the source and the ability of the audience to cope with the
potential threat.78 Message discrepancy (the distance between the message position
and the pre-message position of the receiver) is important to understanding the
relationship between opinionated language and credibility:79 discrepant messages,
and those that use more intense and opinionated language, are rated most
negatively in terms of credibility.80
Related to message discrepancy, there is evidence that receivers are likely to
believe messages that reaffirm existing beliefs.81 Social-psychology studies long
ago demonstrated that individuals tend to search and absorb information that is
in line with their core social beliefs, while omitting or distorting contradictory
information.82 The construction and evaluation of information in social settings is
influenced by the prior beliefs, ideologies, and interests of those involved,83 as well
as their group identities and commitments.84 In heterogeneous societies, in which
different groups hold conflicting social beliefs and ideologies, new information

78

Mark A. Hamilton, Message Variables that Mediate and Moderate the Effect of Equivocal Language on Source
Credibility, 17 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 116 (1998).

79

Generally, evaluations of credibility are higher when message discrepancy is low. Metzger, supra
note 77, at 303.

80

Id.; Hamilton, supra note 78, at 136–37.
This is “the illusory-truth effect.” Metzger, supra note 77, at 303 (citing Ian Maynard Begg et al.,
Dissociation of Processes in Belief: Source Recollection, Statement Familiarity, and the Illusion of Truth, 121 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 446 (1992)). See also Alice Dechêne et al., The Truth About the Truth: A
Meta-analytic Review of the Truth Effect, 14 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. No. 238 (2009).
Among the various psychological mechanisms which contribute to biased assimilation of
information are: cognitive consistency and confirmation bias, Lee Ross & Andrew Ward,
Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution, in 27 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 255,
263–64 (Mark P. Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 1995); motivated cognition, Dan Kahan, Foreword:
Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19
(2012); and threatened social identities, Terrell A. Northrup, The Dynamics of Identity in Personal and
Social Conflict, in INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 55–82 (Louis Kriesberg
et al. eds., 1989); Anne Maass & Mark Schaller, Intergroup Biases and the Cognitive Dynamics of Stereotype
Formation, 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1991); Bar-Tal, supra note 32, at 1445–46.
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Ifat Maoz et al., Reactive Devaluation of an “Israeli” vs. “Palestinian” Peace Proposal, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
515, 543 (2002); see also Roy F. Baumeister & Stephen Hastings, Distortions of Collective Memory: How
Groups Flatter and Deceive Themselves, in COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF POLITICAL EVENTS: SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 277, 287 (James W. Pennebaker et al. eds.,1997). Chan, Burtis, and
Bereiter's study on knowledge construction found that individuals distort and twist information to
make it fit with prior beliefs. Carol Chan, Jud Burtis & Carl Bereiter, Knowledge Building as a Mediator
of Conflict in Conceptual Change, 15 COGNITION & INSTRUCTION 1, 5 (1997).
Dan M. Kahan et al., They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-conduct Distinction, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 851, 859 (2012).
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and its specific framing might trigger belief perseverance or polarization. 85
Perceptions of facts are pervasively shaped by individuals’ commitments to shared
but contested sets of values, beliefs, and identities. Therefore, reaction to new
facts or new information is shaped by values-motivated cognition and identities.86
In a seminal study from 1979, Lord, Ross, and Lepper demonstrated that exposure
to empirical evidence does not typically narrow the gap between those who hold
opposed views at the outset. In fact, exposure to such evidence was found to make
initial disagreements even more pronounced.87 In his book The Righteous Mind—
Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, Jonathan Haidt explains that,
“Once people join a political team, they get ensnared in its moral matrix. They see
confirmation of their grand narrative everywhere, and it’s difficult––perhaps
impossible––to convince them that they are wrong if you argue with them from
outside of their matrix.”88
By now, it is well-established that partisans and ideologues in the U.S.
express differences in factual beliefs.89 Ideological partisanship affects both how
the public learns new information, and which information it learns.90 Taber and
Lodge demonstrated that strong partisans make every effort to maintain their
existing opinions by seeking out confirming evidence, counter-arguing
information that does not fit their preexisting conceptions, and attributing more
strength to arguments that match their opinions.91 The impact of political
identification on biased assimilation of information has been confirmed by
Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon regarding a number of foreign-policy and national
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security issues.92 For example, they have demonstrated a sharp gap between
Democrats and Republicans on various factual beliefs relating to the war in Iraq,
including whether Iraq had possessed WMDs and whether clear evidence had
been found that Iraq had been supporting al-Qaeda.93 Another study emphasized
that even when partisans hold similar factual beliefs, they interpret this
information differently, and these interpretations drive their opinions.94 More
specifically, the study, conducted by Gaines et al., demonstrated that both
Democrats and Republicans updated their factual beliefs about the war in Iraq as
conditions changed, but interpreted the same factual beliefs quite differently.
Democrats consistently interpreted a given level of troop casualties as higher than
Republicans did. Similarly, Democrats interpreted the failure to find weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq as evidence that they never existed, while Republicans
inferred that the Iraqi leadership had moved, destroyed, or hidden the weapons.95
For several decades now, party identification in the U.S. has been strongly
correlated with ideological preferences and beliefs.96 Specifically, people have
sorted into the party-ideology combination of liberal Democrats and conservative
Republicans.97 As early as 1998, Abramowitz and Saunders demonstrated that
voters have been choosing their party identification on the basis of their
ideological preferences rather than maintaining the party allegiance that they
inherited from their parents. Conservatives who were raised by Democratic or
independent parents have moved dramatically toward the Republican Party.98
Mason found that the increasing alignment of partisan and ideological identities
in U.S. society intensifies partisan bias and anger toward the out-group party. She
argues that the result of this process is a nation that agrees on many things but is bitterly
divided nonetheless.99
To summarize, perceived credibility of new information is influenced by
prior beliefs and ideologies, and this effect is exacerbated by the use of intense or
opinionated language (such as language used to express binary legal judgments).
In the U.S., liberals and conservatives, who hold different sets of factual beliefs,
respond differently to new information, based on its consistency with their priors.
92
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Based on this theoretical background, this Article challenges the
fundamental assumption underlying international fact-finding: that more
information means more shared knowledge; and that legal fact-finding reports
resolve controversies concerning war crimes and other violations of international
law. Specifically, I argue that we should expect fact-finding reports concerning war
crimes to be trusted by some social sub-groups, while rejected by others,
depending on the report’s judgment (whether it incriminates or absolves the
relevant society from responsibility). For example, in the U.S., I expect that
individuals holding conservative ideological beliefs (who are less critical of the
U.S. military) will be more likely to discredit information that incriminates U.S.
soldiers for committing war crimes in Afghanistan than those holding liberal views
(who are more critical of the U.S. military). Similarly, individuals who hold
conservative ideological beliefs will be more likely to trust information absolving
the U.S. from responsibility for war crimes than those holding liberal ideological
beliefs.100

2. Emotional biases and receptiveness to fact-finding reports.
Different legal terms have a distinct impact on people’s attitudes and
beliefs.101 Research on “hot cognition”––cognition colored by feeling––suggests
that cognitive and affective determinants often work together to produce people’s
judgments of what they think is just or unjust and right or wrong.102 Words are
agents of emotional judgment-making, as they automatically activate affective, as
well as semantic, associations.103 Lodge and Taber extended the affective and

100
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semantic priming research into the political domain,104 and Morris et al. found that
the emotional evaluation of a political issue is stored with the concept.105 Later,
when thinking about or called on to evaluate this issue, the affective charge is
spontaneously activated from long-term memory and colors all subsequent
cognitive and evaluative judgments about that issue.106 “Genocide,” “crimes
against humanity,” and “war crimes” are all charged political terms that trigger
negative associations. They are commonly referred to by the media and are thus
stored, together with their negative emotional evaluation, in the long-term
memory of individuals. When these terms are invoked by fact-finding missions,
they might trigger a spontaneous activation of these negative emotional
evaluations. For international lawyers, naming these violations is necessary to
accurately analyze events which might—or might not—violate international law,
as defined by the relevant legal framework. For society members, these legal
terms—and their negative “hot” political meanings––may trigger negative
emotional biases in the shamed communities, reactions that may frustrate
attempts to introduce credible new information.
As previously explained, evaluation of information in social settings is
influenced by a complex set of beliefs, ideologies, and identities.107 People appear
unable to break free of their prior sentiments when evaluating arguments on
political issues, even when they are motivated to be impartial.108 While the
previous Section analyzed cognitive bias based on pre-existing ideological
commitments, this section focuses on emotional bias coupled with national
identity sentiment.
Identity is an individual's sense of self.109 It includes social identity, which
captures her knowledge that she belongs to certain social groups, together with
some emotional significance to her of this group membership.110 To enhance their
social identities, individuals tend to behave in ways that make their own group
acquire positive distinctiveness in comparison to other groups.111 By the use of
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symbols such as flags, anthems, uniforms, monuments, and ceremonies, members
are reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship and their sense of
belonging is enhanced.112 When beliefs regarding the national identity or national
narrative begin to be invalidated by incoming information, the individual
experiences threat,113 and responds in a protective manner.114 Therefore, it is likely
that the new invalidating information will be rejected or distorted in order to fit
the national narrative.115 U.S. citizens holding diverse political and ideological
views share at least some level of a national identity, a sentiment which is
heightened in times of national security crisis.116 Therefore, we should expect
subjects to respond to threatening information concerning their national identity
in a nonpartisan manner. Unlike many other areas in American politics, in which
people tend to respond based on partisan affiliation, research shows that a
“national interest” framing of a topic prevents partisan divide. For example,
Levendusky and Horowitz demonstrated that presidential decisions that are
framed in terms of national interest influence the public to evaluate the president’s
actions in a nonpartisan manner, wanting to support the nation.117
Therefore, we should expect that condemning one’s nation using “hot”
political terms such as war crimes, which have strong negative associations
attached to them, may backfire. Specifically, I argue that we should expect the
“hot” war crimes terminology concerning U.S. military actions to trigger a
defensive reaction that decreases the perceived credibility of the information
among U.S. nationals, regardless of their political ideology, in comparison to the
“cold” violation terminology. Even moderates, who are not expected to equally
trust both absolving and incriminating judgments (as they do not express strong
ideological commitments concerning the military), are predicted to respond
negatively to the invocation of “war crimes” terminology.118 Confirmation bias
112

113
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115
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and cognitive consistency theories explain why liberals and conservatives respond
in opposite ways to new information, based on their pre-existing beliefs and
ideological commitments. However, hot cognition theory, together with
threatened identity dynamics, explain why a “war crimes” framing negatively
influences the perceived fairness and credibility of fact-finding reports among U.S.
nationals uniformly.

3. Judging truth by its cover: Institutional legitimacy and receptiveness
to fact-finding reports.
Can acceptance of threatening information, or information that is
inconsistent with prior beliefs, be increased by deference to trusted legal
institutions? Empirical research on source credibility began in the twentieth
century, and focused on the impact of source credibility on attitude change and
persuasion.119 Communications and social psychology literature on source
credibility has found evidence demonstrating that different perceptions of source
credibility differentially affect message evaluations.120 Hovland and Weiss defined
source credibility in terms of expertise and trustworthiness, 121 and suggested that
credibility dimensions will differ depending upon the type of source being
evaluated and the context in which the evaluation occurs.122 Following their
studies, many researchers found evidence for both source expertise and source
trustworthiness as important dimensions influencing perceived credibility. 123
Additionally, it was established that positive regard for and similarity to the source
influence audience perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise.124 While the
majority of these studies focused on individuals giving a speech, recent studies
tested the credibility of organizational sources, finding similar results.125
Nonetheless, while source credibility is an important factor in studying message
evaluations, the majority of the research suggests that the effects of source
credibility are situational, and that various factors have mediating effects on the
impact of source credibility on message evaluations (including factors relating to
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the message content, receivers’ characteristics, and a person’s initial attitude
toward the advocated position).126
Another dimension influencing message evaluations, stemming from a
different theoretical framework, is the perceived fairness of the process producing
the relevant information. Procedural justice studies have examined the impact of
perceived fairness of the legal process on people’s acceptance of their judgments.
In their book Trust in the Law, Taylor and Huo find that acceptance of legal
decisions increases when people regard the agents of the legal system as acting in
a way they perceive to be fair and trustworthy.127
Based on this theoretical literature, I suggest that discrepant or threatening
messages will be evaluated more positively coming from a trusted institution than
from an untrusted one. As public opinion polls show, conservatives in the U.S.
are more likely to have favorable opinions of U.S. military courts than liberals, and
liberals are more likely to have favorable opinions of the U.N. than
conservatives.128 Accordingly, I argue that conservatives will be more likely to trust
counter-attitudinal information (reports incriminating U.S. soldiers for killing
Afghan civilians), if that information is conveyed by a U.S. military court rather
than a U.N. fact-finding mission. Similarly, I argue liberals will be more likely to
trust counter-attitudinal information (absolving fact-finding reports) coming from
the U.N. rather than a U.S. military court.129

C. Challenging the Mobilization Assumption: Legal Truth Does
Not Affect Attitudes
The previous Section challenged the assumption that fact-finding reports
concerning war crimes resolve factual controversies concerning what happened
(the credibility assumption). I hypothesized that the perceived credibility of a factfinding report is determined by the consistency of the report’s legal judgment with
ideological commitments and prior beliefs, as well as by the concrete legal
terminology used to describe the events.130 The following Section focuses on the
impact of legal frames on social attitudes, and challenges the assumption that
126
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exposure to incriminating legal reports motivates in-group condemnation of the
perpetrators. I argue that fact-finding reports face complex social dynamics that
frustrate or diminish their ability to meaningfully influence attitudes on
accountability measures concerning war crimes.

1. Naming, shaming, and legal framing.
Does incriminating legal framing mobilize people to support penalizing their
compatriots for committing war crimes against their enemies? Does international
condemnation of the U.S., for example, for committing war crimes in
Afghanistan, instigate a public outcry for punishing the offenders? Many
international and domestic advocacy organizations assume that it does. Their
model is simple: incriminating fact-finding reports inform the public that crimes
were committed, and the public forms attitudes on sanctioning based on these
findings. This Article suggests a different model. It argues that fact-finding reports
have little impact on social attitudes concerning accountability due to several
psychological mechanisms.
First, some individuals are likely to reject the information altogether due to
cognitive inconsistency, based on their pre-existing beliefs and attitudes. Socialpsychology literature has demonstrated time and again that exposure to credible
evidence is not enough to change people’s attitudes on some issues.131 Mounting
scientific evidence on the benefits of vaccinations, the ineffectiveness of the death
penalty, or the existence of global warming fail to change the attitudes of those
who oppose vaccinations, support the death penalty, or deny that global warming
is happening.132
Second, while some deny the factual evidence altogether, others accept the
facts but interpret them in a way that validates their pre-existing attitudes.133 For
example, both Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. accepted the fact that
weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq, but gave this fact a different
meaning: for Democrats, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
meant that such weapons never existed, while Republicans inferred that Iraq had
moved, destroyed, or hidden the weapons.134
131
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Third, others may accept the facts and agree on their interpretation, but
disagree on the solution or policy to address the issue. Acceptance of a set of facts
does not necessarily mean agreement on the appropriate course of action. For
example, Campbell and Kay demonstrated that Republicans’ increased skepticism
toward environmental sciences may be partly attributable to a conflict between
specific ideological values and the most popularly discussed environmental
solutions.135 Interestingly, Republicans tripled their acceptance of scientific
evidence on global warming when it was coupled with a free-market-friendly
solution rather than a government-regulation solution.136
Similarly, we should not expect that attitudes on sanctioning soldiers who
allegedly violated the laws of war will change simply because a fact-finding report
determines that they should. Literature on crime and punishment demonstrates
that sanctioning attitudes––just like attitudes on gun control or global warming–
–are primarily determined by political and ideological values and not by factual
evidence concerning the circumstances of individual cases.137 As liberals tend to
be more critical of the U.S. military than conservatives, liberals are expected to be
more likely to condemn U.S. soldiers for misconduct on the battlefield. However,
being critical of the military and accepting incriminating evidence does not
necessarily translate into unequivocal support for prosecuting and punishing the
soldiers. Some may believe that criminal prosecution is too harsh, some may feel
sympathy for the soldiers, some may find it sufficient to simply acknowledge the
wrongdoing, and some may assign blame to commanders and political leaders
rather than the soldiers on the ground, and argue that those higher up the chain
of command should bear responsibility. Therefore, even among those who find
the incriminating judgment credible, we should expect variation in the willingness
to impose any penalties on soldiers. In the end, the legal judgment of a fact-finding
report in itself is not sufficient to influence attitudes and mobilize domestic
sanctioning of in-group offenders. I therefore predict that only a minority of U.S.
nationals will support penalizing U.S. soldiers after being exposed to a fact-finding
report accusing them of committing war crimes, and that the legal judgment––
whether incriminating or absolving––will not determine the willingness to
penalize the soldiers.138
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2. Are moral judgments more powerful than legal judgments?
If, indeed, legal discourse is ineffective in mobilizing domestic
condemnation of in-group offenders, is there a better way to mobilize domestic
support for accountability?139
In her article Words and the Door to the Land of Change, Martha Minow explores
the potential power of words to effectuate social change. She observes that judges
use a certain language––like that of a remote clinical evaluation––and adopt
neutral and obscure phrases like “abuse,” “multiple bruises and abrasions,” and
“suspicious injuries,” which undermine the sense of personal connection and
individual obligation to effectuate change.140 She wonders “whether words by
lawyers and judges differ from words by journalists, and whether the more
intimate and yet more widely accessible languages of literature and popular music
lyrics may change minds and prompt actions.”141 Minow suggests that different
forms of expression solicit different responses, and argues that “finding languages
to persuade judges, to empower victims, and to mobilize onlookers present linked
yet distinct difficulties.”142 Drawing on Minow’s argument, I suggest that the use
of legal discourse to describe facts might be counter-productive. To test this
argument, I compare the impact of legal and moral condemnations on willingness
to sanction in-group offenders and to compensate out-group victims.143

D. The Legalization of Truth: Problems and Solutions
This Article argues that the most common organizational structure of
international fact-finding––a legal-discourse-based structure, lacking enforcement
capacity––is based on a flawed understanding of the relevant socio-psychological
processes and dynamics. The binary legal judgment or outcome of the fact-finding
report triggers ideological-based belief polarization; the adoption of “hot” legal
terminology reduces the perceived fairness of the report; and the legal frame is less
effective than a moral frame in influencing attitudes. Overall, the legal discourse
139
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is ineffective in creating a shared history, disseminating an authoritative account
of contested facts, and mobilizing domestic attitudes to condemn in-group
offenders. When faced with unsettling facts, various cognitive and emotional
biases prevent individuals from accepting these facts at face value and from
modifying their attitudes accordingly. Some individuals are likely to reject the
information based on its inconsistency with their prior beliefs; some are likely to
reinterpret the report to fit their ideological commitments; and others may accept
the facts but reject their legal implications. Therefore, the core assumptions
underlying international fact-finding efforts—that they contribute to resolving
factual disputes and mobilizing domestic sanctioning––should be questioned.
To test these assumptions and to more directly study the domestic effects of
fact-finding reports, while mitigating problems of selection effects, I designed and
fielded a pair of survey-experiments for the U.S. public.144 To operationalize my
hypotheses concerning the impact of the legalization of truth on both the
perceived credibility of the fact-finding report and the willingness to sanction ingroup offenders, I focused on three main aspects of legal discourse: first, the
binary legal judgment or outcome, comparing an incriminating judgment with an
absolving one. Second, the legal terminology, comparing cold “violation” language
with hot “war crime” language. Third, the legal frame itself, comparing legal and
moral frames describing the exact same findings and outcomes. Experiment I
(conducted in April 2014) measures the perceived credibility of a fact-finding report,
given three legal judgments: two incriminating legal judgments (“violating
international law” and “committing war crimes”) and one absolving legal
judgment (“not violating international law”); and three institutions rendering these
reports: the U.N., a U.S. military court and a U.S. federal court. Experiment II
(conducted in December 2013), measures the persuasive power of moral, as opposed
to legal, framing of the report’s findings, and the respective impact on attitudes
concerning accountability measures.
Random assignment increases the likelihood that treatment and control
groups are similar to each other on average across all observed and unobserved
factors. “By comparing differences in responses between groups, an experimental
design can estimate with greater certainty the effect of” legal truth on factual
beliefs and attitudes regarding domestic sanctioning of in-group offenders.145
Unlike observational data (such as national surveys), the experimental approach
provides us with a direct measure to assess the efficacy of fact-finding reports,
depending on their main characteristics, including the legal discourse, the final
judgment, and the institution establishing the mission. The limitations of
experimental methods include, of course, their external validity––the degree to
144
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which results are generalizable to broader phenomena of interest. Experiments
also reduce scenarios to a few key variables, often implemented over a short time
period, compared to the complex and fluid nature of everyday relations. Subjects
may act differently in laboratory settings than in real life conditions. I tried to
alleviate these issues by conducting surveys at different points in time; using
nationally representative samples; and providing vignettes that closely resemble
real-world situations. Additionally, in two separate studies I test the
generalizability of these findings, first, to other societies, by fielding similar
experiments in other countries, including Australia and Israel; and, second, to
domestic law, testing this theoretical framework on the current controversy in the
U.S. concerning police violence against African Americans and the “Black Lives
Matter” movement. Taking these limitations in mind, the experimental evidence
that follows provides a basis for further inquiry.

III. E XPERIMENT I: T HE E FFECTS OF L EGAL T R UTH ON THE
P ERCEIVED C REDIBILITY OF F ACTS
Experiment I was fielded in April 2014 as part of the 2014 American
National Opinion Survey (ANOS), an original internet survey of U.S. citizens
carried out by YouGov. YouGov uses sampling and matching techniques to
generate a sample that approximates the demographic composition of the adult
U.S. population.146

A. Design
Two thousand respondents were randomly assigned to one of three legal
judgments (judgment condition: “cold” incriminating judgment (“violating
international law” (IJ)), “hot” incriminating judgment (“committing war crimes”
(WC)), and “cold” absolving judgment (“not violating international law” (AJ)),
and to one of three institutions United Nations (U.N.), United States Military
Court (MC) and United States Federal Court (FC).
Respondents were told that they would be asked questions about a military
operation in Afghanistan that happened a few months ago. They were also told
that since the facts of the case were unclear (especially how many people died, and
whether the casualties were Al-Qaeda members or innocent civilians), an
investigation was conducted by one of the three institutions mentioned above.
Respondents were then presented with the investigation’s executive summary,
which included two parts: a “summary of facts” and a “summary of the legal
judgment.” Both parts were designed to look like a formal document, including
the institution’s logo, the document’s serial number, and the date.
146

See Appendix IX(2) for further information about the construction of the ANOS sample; see Table
1 for descriptive statistics of the sample.
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The summary of facts described an event that happened recently in
Afghanistan, in which a Taliban fighter killed a U.S. Marine with an explosive
device. Three Marines, who witnessed the explosion, chased the attacker into a
nearby marketplace, shooting their guns repeatedly. Eventually, they were able to
kill the attacker, but four unarmed Afghan bystanders were also killed by the
Marines’ gunfire. The wording of the “summary of facts” was identical for all three
conditions, and the only differences were the logo and name of the institution
producing the report.
After reading the factual summary of the events, respondents were presented
with the legal judgment. First, the report stated the relevant legal standard,
according to which soldiers are obliged to exercise reasonable care to protect
civilians during armed conflicts. Second, the report applied this standard to the
facts of the case, concluding that the U.S. Marines violated international law,
committed war crimes, or did not violate international law.
After reading the report’s summary, respondents were then asked three
questions on the credibility of the report (its accuracy, objectivity, and fairness).
Additionally, the survey included demographic, political, social, and economic
measurements, including gender, education, ideology, political identification,
religiousness, interest in news, and financial situation.147 The three judgmentcondition structure implies a factorial design with three experimental groups. The
full text for this and the subsequent survey instrument are provided in Appendix
IX(3).
This design was very carefully constructed to be as realistic as possible
without inserting any bias for or against sanctioning the soldiers. First, I chose a
scenario from the war in Afghanistan because this conflict is less politicized in
American public opinion than the war in Iraq; moreover, it adds to the credibility
of the scenario, as this conflict is ongoing, with American troops still deployed in
Afghanistan. Second, I calibrated the scale or severity of the event to allow for
credible variation in the legal judgment and decrease social desirability bias. Survey
questions asking about sensitive issues often generate socially motivated
misreporting and distort survey estimates.148 In other words, due to selfpresentation concerns, survey respondents underreport socially undesirable
activities and overreport socially desirable ones. In this case, designing an
experimental scenario in which U.S. soldiers are responsible for large-scale war
crimes and crimes against humanity could have motivated respondents to conceal
their true attitudes, finding it socially undesirable to support soldiers who are
responsible for mass killings. Adopting an extreme scenario could have therefore
147
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For a full description of the experimental treatments and the survey questions, see Appendix IX(3).
For a full list of the measurements used, see Appendix IX(2).
Ivar Krumpal, Determinants of Social Desirability Bias in Sensitive Surveys: a Literature Review, 47 QUALITY
& QUANTITY 2025, 2026 (2013).
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triggered social desirability bias that would have generated estimate errors
concerning willingness to condemn and prosecute soldiers who violated
international law. Additionally, a mass killing scenario would have decreased the
credibility of the vignette, as an absolving judgment may have seemed
incongruous following a description of a large-scale massacre. To be able to
credibly vary the legal judgment based on the same facts, it was necessary to design
a smaller-scale incident. Third, typically individuals are exposed to this type of
information through the media. However, I decided against using media coverage
of the report, and instead presented participants with a direct “quote” of the
executive summary of the report, in order to observe the reaction to the report
and its source, rather than to the media outlet reporting about it. This design was
carefully constructed to capture real-life reactions to fact-finding reports, and was
pretested on 600 Amazon M-Turk users to test for manipulation checks and
believability of the vignette, and to allow respondents to comment, express, and
explain their reactions.
By design, random assignment improves the chances experimental groups
differ only with respect to the treatment. As expected, tests indicate groups
assigned to the three treatment groups were comparable across all observed
characteristics.149

B. Measures
Report’s Credibility. The literature suggests that the perceived credibility
of information has several dimensions, including accuracy, objectivity, and
fairness.150 On the basis of these previous studies, I used three items to assess the
perceived credibility of the report, its factual findings, and its final
conclusion/judgment (“Do you think that the facts summarized by the investigators are:
Completely inaccurate . . . Completely accurate?”; “Do you think that the report is: Completely
unfair . . . Completely fair?”; “Do you think that the judgment is: Completely biased . . .
Completely objective?”). Respondents indicated their attitudes on a six-point scale;
these data were later recoded to range from 0 (completely unfair/inaccurate) to
149
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I conducted an extensive series of balancing tests comparing the distribution across treatment
groups for all available baseline covariates that likely affect attitudes concerning war crimes,
including gender, age, education, income, religion, and race.
Andrew J. Flanagin & Miriam J. Metzger, Perceptions of Internet Information Credibility, 77 JOURNALISM
& MASS COMM. Q. 515, 525 (2000); Cecilie Gaziano & Kristin McGrath, Measuring the Concept of
Credibility, 63 JOURNALISM Q. 451, 451–62 (1986); Philip Meyer, Defining and Measuring Credibility of
Newspapers: Developing an Index, 65 JOURNALISM Q. 567, 567–74, 588 (1988); John Newhagen &
Clifford Nass, Differential Criteria for Evaluating Credibility of Newspapers and TV News, 66 JOURNALISM
Q. 277, 277–84 (1989); Tony Rimmer and David Weaver, Different Questions, Different Answers? Media
Use and Credibility, 64 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 28 (1987); Eugene F. Shaw, Media Credibility:
Taking the Measure of a Measure, 50 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 306 (1973); Mark Douglas West,
Validating a Scale for the Measurement of Credibility: A Covariance Structure Modeling Approach, 71
JOURNALISM Q. 159, 159–68 (1994).
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100 (completely fair/accurate). The same response scale was used for all other
measures in Experiment I unless otherwise noted. As these three items were
highly correlated, for simplicity, the analysis presents the results for the fairness
variable, which captured the overall reaction to the report as a whole.
Institution’s favorability. Responders were asked for their opinion on the
relevant institutions (the U.N., U.S. federal courts and U.S. military courts).
Participants indicated their attitudes on a 4-point scale, from “very favorable” to
“very unfavorable”; these data were later recoded to range from 0 (very
unfavorable) to 100 (very favorable).
Political ideology. Respondents rated their political ideology on a 5-point
scale (1=“very liberal”; 3=“moderate”; 5=“very conservative”), and indicated the
level of their political party identification on a 7-point scale (1=“strong
Democrat”; 4=“Independent”; 7=“strong Republican”).
Control Variables. Because of randomization, complex statistical models
involving a battery of control variables are unnecessary for obtaining valid
inferences regarding the effect of international fact-finding. Nonetheless, to
increase confidence in any empirical findings, I conducted a set of regressions
which controlled for demographic variables including gender, education, income,
and age. The effect of legal judgment became even more robust controlling for
various demographic variables.

C. Results
1. Legal discourse fails to resolve factual controversies.
The main effect of the legal judgment (whether incriminating or absolving)
was not significant across subjects (t(1,312)=1.02, p=.3). However, as shown in
Figure 1, the effect of the legal judgment was significantly different for liberals
and conservatives: liberal subjects showed a preference for incriminating legal
judgment (mean difference t(323)=-8.26, p=.000), whereas conservatives showed
a preference for absolving legal judgment (mean difference t(447)=7.8, p=.000).
Moderates did not show any preference (t(421)=.2, p=.84). This means there is a
distinction between what liberals and conservatives in the U.S. believe to be true:
conservatives are especially skeptical of incriminating reports, particularly when
compared with liberals, and liberals are skeptical of absolving reports, particularly
when compared with conservatives. Figure 2 shows that, in contrast to individuals
with pre-existing ideological convictions, individuals who self-report as moderates
attribute similar levels of fairness to both incriminating and absolving reports,
which are lower than the perceived credibility liberals and conservatives attribute
to information consistent with their ideological commitments, but higher than the
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perceived credibility liberals and conservatives attribute to information
inconsistent with their priors.151
Next, I conducted a linear regression of perceived fairness of the report (the
dependent variable) on the legal judgment (dichotomous independent variable),
ideology, and their interaction. As shown in Figure 1, the model revealed the
predicted interactive pattern b=-14.6, SE=1.2, t(1,193)=-11.6, p<0.001. This
confirms that different social groups respond in different ways to new evidence
concerning war crimes.

Figure 2. Report Fairness, by Judgment Condition and Ideology
Figure presents the mean values of the Report Fairness, by ideology. 95% CI’s shown.

2. The invocation of “war crimes” is counterproductive.
I tested the impact of “war crimes” on the perceived fairness of the report.
As expected, the main effect for war crimes was significant and negative: t(1320)=2.75, p<.01. In other words, invoking a “war crimes” terminology decreases the
151

See Appendix IX(4), Table 3, for summary of treatment effects.

Summer 2017

119

Chicago Journal of International Law

perceived fairness of the report compared with a “violation” terminology. While
statistically significant, this effect is small (Cohen’s d=0.15) and accounts for about
5% change in the perceived fairness of the report. The negative effect of war
crimes terminology on perceived fairness is not moderated by ideology. There was
a significant difference between perceived fairness of war crimes and violation for
conservatives (t(410)=-2.3, p=.01) and moderates (t(442)=-1.9, p=.05), but
although the direction was as expected with regard to liberals (means difference 3.6), this difference was not significant (t(352)=-1.44, p=.14). Figure 3
demonstrates the main effect of the legal judgment framing (“war crimes” versus
“violation”) on perceived fairness of the report, and Figure 4 shows the means
difference of war crimes and violations framings for liberals, moderates, and
conservatives.

Figure 3. Report Fairness, by Legal Terminology

Figure presents the mean values of the Report Fairness, by Legal Terminology and Ideology. 95% CI’s shown.
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Figure 4. Report Fairness, by Legal Terminology and Ideology

Figure presents the mean values of the Report Fairness, by Legal Terminology and Ideology. 95% CI’s shown.

3. Legal judgment trumps an institution’s favorability.
In general, U.S. nationals have a more favorable opinion of U.S. military
courts than of the U.N. A majority of Americans (62 percent) have a favorable
opinion of U.S. military courts, while only about half of Americans (51 percent)
have a favorable opinion of the U.N.152 However, the level of support varies
considerably by political ideology. A strong majority of liberals in the U.S. (77
percent) have a favorable view of the U.N., while a smaller majority of moderates
(58 percent) agree. Meanwhile, support among conservatives trails at 24 percent.
Conversely, a strong majority of conservatives in the U.S. (76 percent) have a
favorable opinion of U.S. military courts, while a smaller majority of moderates
(62 percent) and a minority of liberals (45 percent) agree. To demonstrate the
moderating effect of political ideology on institution favorability, I conducted a
linear regression of institution favorability on institution (UN/MC), ideology, and
their interaction. The model revealed the predicted interactive pattern, b=.6,
SE=.04, t(1,093)=13.3, p<0.001. This confirms the findings of previous studies
on trust in international institutions,153 which found that liberals demonstrate a
more favorable opinion of the U.N. compared with conservatives.
I hypothesized that these institution-favorability trends translate to an
increase in the perceived fairness of counter-attitudinal reports, when the counterattitudinal report is issued by a trusted institution. Namely, liberals will be more
152
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As shown in Figure 5, I found a main effect for Military Court on favorability: b=10.5, t(1,163)=5.7,
p<.001).
U.N. Retains Strong Global Image: Robust Support in America, Especially among Democrats, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Sept. 2013), https://perma.cc/4AM5-7NGX.
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likely to trust absolving reports issued by the U.N. than those issued by U.S.
military courts, and conservatives will be more likely to trust incriminating reports
issued by U.S. military courts rather than those produced by the U.N. This
hypothesis is further supported by the goals and agendas of both institutions: if
the U.N. report that was specifically designed to “end impunity” finds the U.S.
Marines innocent, it must be true; and similarly, if the U.S. military court itself
finds U.S. Marines guilty, then it must be so. However, as shown in Figures 5 and
6, the results failed to reject the null hypotheses that the identity of the institution
has no effect on the perceived fairness of counter-attitudinal reports.154 I found
that both liberals and conservatives were slightly more willing to trust counterattitudinal reports issued by the U.S. military court, but both findings were
statistically insignificant.

Figure 5. Report Fairness (Conservatives), by Legal Judgments and Institution

Figure presents the mean values of the Report Fairness, by Legal Judgment and Institution. 95% CI’s shown.

154

For conservatives presented with an incriminating report, the difference of means had the predicted
direction, but no statistical significance (t(136)=-1.18, p=0.23). For liberals presented with an
absolving report, the difference of means did not have the predicted direction and was also not
statistically significant (t(101)=-1.3, p=0.19).
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Figure 6. Report Fairness (Liberals), by Legal Judgments and Institution

Figure presents the mean values of the Report Fairness, by Legal Judgment and Institution. 95% CI’s shown.

Nonetheless, I did find that the polarizing effect of legal judgment on report
fairness (the moderating effect of political ideology on report fairness given
different legal judgments) was mitigated when the report was issued by the U.S.
military court. That is to say, given an incriminating legal judgment, the difference
of means for liberals and conservatives was 26.25 (Cohen’s d=1.06, large effect
size) if the U.N. issued the report and only 17.83 (Cohen’s d=0.66, medium effect
size) if the report was issued by the U.S. military court. Similarly, given an
absolving legal judgment, the difference of means was -25.15 (Cohen’s d=0.9) if
issued by the U.N. and only -14.44 (Cohen’s d=0.5) if issued by the U.S. military
court.155

IV. E XPERIMENT II: T H E E FFECT OF L EGAL AND M ORAL
F RAMINGS ON W ILLINGNESS TO S ANCTION
I N -G ROUP O FFENDERS
Experiment II was fielded within the 2013 American National Opinion
Survey (ANOS), an original internet survey of U.S. citizens carried out by
YouGov. 1,000 respondents were randomly assigned to the control group
(N=185) or one of four treatment groups: Incriminating Legal Judgment
(N=199), Absolving Legal Judgment (N=206), Incriminating Moral Judgment
(N=213), and Absolving Moral Judgment (N=197).156
155
156

See Appendix IX(4), Table 3, for summary of treatment effects.
See Appendix IX(2) for further information about the construction of the ANOS sample. See Table
2 for descriptive statistics of the sample.
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A. Design
The design was similar to that of Experiment I: subjects were told that they
would be asked questions about a military operation in Afghanistan that happened
a few months ago. They were also told that since the facts of the case were unclear
(especially how many people died, and whether the casualties were al-Qaeda
members or innocent civilians), a team of international experts was asked to
investigate. Treated subjects were then presented with the summary of the
investigators’ factual findings, followed by a summary of the investigators’
judgment (that the investigation concluded that the Marines acted illegally, legally,
immorally, or morally). Control-group subjects were only presented with the
summary of the factual findings (no judgment/conclusion was provided).
The summary of facts was identical to the one used in Experiment I, and
was presented to all participants. The summary of conclusions was similar to the
one used in Experiment I, but in this experiment, I introduced a non-legal
conclusion, based on a moral standard. The moral conclusions were similar to the
legal “violation” treatment used in Experiment I, but replaced the term
“international law” with “universal moral standards” and the words “legal
standards” and “legal responsibility” with “moral standard” and “moral
responsibility.” Otherwise the experiment was identical to Experiment I.

B. Measures
Willingness to sanction. Three items were used to assess the degree of

willingness to sanction in-group offenders. First, I measured the subjects’ opinion
of the soldiers’ behavior, and their willingness to condemn the soldiers’ behavior
(“The U.S. Marines did the best they could under the circumstances.”). This item was
recoded as the reversed item (“The U.S. Marines did not do the best they could under the
circumstances.”). Second, I measured the subjects’ support of prosecuting the
soldiers (“The U.S. Marines should be prosecuted.”). Third, I measured the subjects’
support of compensating the Afghan victims (“The US Government should compensate
the Afghan victims.”)
All other measures were identical to Experiment I.

C. Results
Before discussing the unique results of this experiment, I should mention
that findings on the interaction model of legal judgment and ideology on report
fairness were replicated in this experiment, thus providing further support for the
findings of Experiment I.
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1. The legalization of truth and attitude mobilization.
To test the impact of legal judgments on attitude mobilization, I first
conducted a linear regression of willingness to condemn the soldiers (dependent
variable) on legal judgment. The model revealed the predicted pattern, b=-2.08,
SE=3.12, t(403)=-.66, p>.5. I conducted another linear regression of willingness
to prosecute the soldiers on legal judgment, and found a similar pattern: b=-1.01,
SE=3.14, t(403)=-0.32, p>.7. In both cases, whether the soldiers violated the law
did not change participants’ willingness to condemn the soldiers or support
prosecuting them. All four means represent an unchanged negative attitude on
condemning or prosecuting the soldiers. In short, the legal judgment did not
influence attitudes or mobilize support for accountability measures.157
Interestingly, the one variable that was affected by the legal judgment was
willingness to compensate the victims. However, respondents were more willing to
compensate the victims when told that the soldiers did not violate the law, than when
they were told the soldiers did violate the law. In other words, given an absolving
legal judgment, participants did not show a negative attitude on compensating the
victims. Figure 7 summarizes these findings.
Figure 7. Willingness to Condemn, Prosecute, and Compensate, by
Legal Judgment

157

See Appendix IX(4), Table 4, for summary of treatment effects.
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Figure 7 presents the mean values of Willingness to Condemn the Soldiers, Willingness to Prosecute the Soldiers, and
Willingness to Compensate the Victims, by Legal Judgment. 95 percent% CI’s shown.

Figures 8 and 9 reveal that, as expected, willingness to condemn or prosecute
the soldiers is largely dependent on political ideology, and only marginally affected
(if at all) by the legal judgment. In fact, the only effect of legal judgment that was
statistically significant was the positive effect of the absolving legal judgment (in
comparison to the incriminating legal judgment) on willingness to compensate the
victims.
Figure 8. Willingness to Prosecute, by Legal Judgment and Ideology

Figure 8 presents the mean values of Willingness to Prosecute the Soldiers, by Legal Judgment and Ideology. 95 percent CI’s
shown.

Figure 9. Willingness to Compensate, by Legal Judgment and Ideology

Figure presents the mean values of Willingness to Compensate the Victims, by Legal Judgment and Ideology. 95 percent CI’s
shown.
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Figure 10 summarizes the impact of incriminating legal reports on domestic
beliefs and attitudes in the U.S.: a small majority of participants (56 percent) found
the report fair, and of those, only about half (26 percent of all participants)
supported prosecuting the perpetrators. Of the 44 percent of participants that
found the report to be unfair, almost all were unwilling to support prosecuting the
perpetrators. While I found both ideology and gender to be predictors of support
in prosecuting in-group perpetrators, more data should be collected to fully
explain why a belief that soldiers committed war crimes does not translate into
willingness to sanction them.
Figure 10. Willingness to Prosecute, by Report’s Fairness (Incriminating
Judgment Conditions)

Figure presents the percentage of individuals who indicated their support or opposition for prosecuting the soldiers, by acceptance
or rejection of the Report Fairness. 95 percent% CI’s shown.

2. Are there more effective alternatives to legal truth?
The results indicate that, as expected, legal truth was not effective in
mobilizing domestic attitudes on war crimes. But can different language or
framing of the events be more effective in influencing such attitudes?
To test the hypothesis that moral framing may be more effective in
mobilizing domestic attitudes on war crimes, I conducted a linear regression of
willingness to prosecute on incriminating judgment framing (dichotomous
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variable, moral judgment =1). The model revealed the predicted pattern: b=9.1,
SE=3, t(411)=2.9, p=.003 (Cohen d=-0.29). This shows that respondents who
were told that the soldiers violated moral standards were significantly more willing
to prosecute the soldiers than those who were told that the soldiers violated legal
standards. I repeated the regression analysis with both condemnation and
compensation variables, with similar results: condemning the soldiers: b=7.3,
SE=2.9, t(411)=2.4, p=.01; compensating the victims: b=8.6, SE=3.31,
t(411)=2.6, p<.01.
Figure 11. Willingness to Prosecute, by Judgment Condition

Figure presents the mean values of Willingness to Prosecute the Soldiers, by Experimental Condition (Legal Judgment and
Framing). 95 percent% CI’s shown.

Next, I tested whether these findings are moderated by ideology. As reported
in Table 4, liberals are generally more willing to prosecute U.S. soldiers than
moderates and conservatives. However, the main effect of moral frame of
incriminating judgment is not moderated by ideology, and the incriminating moral
frame treatment increased willingness to prosecute for liberals, moderates, and
conservatives.158

158

See Appendix IX(4), Table 4, for summary of treatment effects.
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V. D ISC USSION AND THEORE TICAL I MPLIC ATIONS
“What happens to these reports when they are ‘released?’ The resources that
organizations devote to compiling all this information are not matched by
attention to how reports are disseminated or what impact they might have on
target audiences.”159
This Article sheds light on “what happens” to international fact-finding
reports when they are released. It focuses on their domestic audience, and
examines how different legal and moral framings of incriminating and absolving
judgments influence the perceived credibility of the reports and the willingness to
sanction in-group offenders. Its main findings are as follows.

A. More Information, More Bias
Experiment I demonstrated that fact-finding reports are trusted by some
social sub-groups, while rejected by others, depending on the report’s legal
judgment (whether it incriminates or absolves the relevant individuals or social
groups from responsibility). Specifically, it demonstrated that in the U.S.,
individuals who hold conservative ideological beliefs are more likely than those
who hold liberal views to discredit information that incriminates U.S. soldiers for
committing war crimes in Afghanistan. Similarly, it found that individuals who
hold liberal ideological beliefs are more likely than those holding conservative
ideological beliefs to discredit information absolving the U.S. from responsibility
for war crimes. This finding was replicated in Experiment II. While these findings
are consistent with similar findings relating to other sources of information (“the
hostile media bias”160) and other areas of factual disagreements (death penalty,161
global warming162), it is nonetheless important to establish that legal judgments
conveyed by international or domestic institutions might trigger similar reactions
with regard to issues such as war crimes. Establishing that the perceived credibility
of fact-finding reports is largely determined by political and ideological
commitments has unique significance with regard to legal institutions, which,
unlike the media, are authoritative in making factual determinations concerning
legal disputes.163 One possible explanation for this finding lies in the fundamental
159

Cohen, supra note 56, at 518.
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Robert P. Vallone, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and
Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 577, 577–78 (1985).

161

Lord, Ross & Lepper, supra note 87, at 2098–2100.
Kahan et al., supra note 132, at 732.
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For a somewhat similar argument, though in a different context, see Kahan, Hoffman & Braman,
supra note 86 (demonstrating the impact of culture cognition on both decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the public perception of its judgments).
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disagreements on substantive questions of international law and their applicability
to different contexts. In the decentralized international legal system, the
interpretation of international law raises many unresolved controversies. Eyal
Benvenisti argues that the content of international humanitarian law (or the law
of armed conflict) depends on the identity of the interpreting body––whether it is
a government involved in transnational armed conflict, or an international
organization.164 Adding a layer of disputable legal conclusions to factual
determinations exposes the factual description to criticisms based on a
disagreement with the legal conclusion, and shifts the attention from the facts to
their legal meaning. If the content of international law is subjective, as some argue,
it is not at all surprising that legalized fact-finding reports are treated similarly to
other sources of information, that their perceived credibility is moderated by
political ideology, and that instead of a deliberative process of truth-seeking, as
suggested by Thomas Risse,165 we witness a growing polarization concerning both
the facts and their meaning.

B. War Crimes Terminology Decreases Perceived Credibility of
Fact-Finding Reports
The language and terms we choose influence how our message is being
processed and assimilated. Just as with any other organizing theme, legal
terminology creates frames under which information is being categorized and
interpreted.166 McCaffery, Kahneman, and Spitzer demonstrated how different
legal terms used in jury instructions have led to substantive differences in
compensation awards.167 Cupp and Polage found that jurors are more likely to
award damages if the information they receive is presented using a negligence
framing (a “hot” legal terminology that assigns responsibility based on
blameworthiness) than if the information is presented to them using a strict
liability framing (a “cold” legal terminology, assigning responsibility regardless of
blameworthiness).168
Similarly, the results of Experiment I demonstrate that the choice of legal
terminology, and specifically, between “hot” war crimes terminology and “cold”
164

Eyal Benvenisti, The Legal Battle to Define the Law on Transnational Asymmetric Warfare, 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 339, 358–59 (2009).
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Thomas Risse, “Let's Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 1–2 (2000).
McCaffery, Kahneman & Spitzer, supra note 101, at 1344–46, 1353. See also Richard K. Sherwin,
Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 40–43
(1994).
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violations terminology, influenced the perceived credibility of fact-finding reports.
The war crimes terminology decreased the perceived fairness of the report in
comparison to the legal violation terminology. David Scheffer, who served as the
U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues at the U.N., suggested that legal
terms such as “war crimes,” “crimes against humanity,” and “genocide” are so
tainted by political meanings that they should not be used by legal institutions at
all.169 While some Americans believe that the U.S. occasionally violates
international law in the course of armed conflicts, they are less willing to go so far
as to characterize these violations as war crimes. Interestingly, moderates, who did
not hold strong priors and were just as likely to believe incriminating and
absolving reports, were less likely to believe the report when the war crimes
terminology was used. These findings suggest that several cognitive and emotional
biases have distinct impacts on individuals from different social groups when
processing new information. While cognitive consistency is at play when one
confronts counter-attitudinal facts, hot cognition and threatened identity
dynamics become more pronounced when national narratives are challenged.
Scheffer correctly identified that when individuals think about “war crimes”
they attach a certain political meaning to the phrase.170 As is often the case in real
life, the legal judgment of the events described in the experiments was debatable.
In such a situation, while “war crimes” might be the correct legal term, nonlawyers might adopt a political, rather than a legal, interpretation of this term and
attach a different meaning to it. For example, a political interpretation of the term
“war crimes” may include a certain gravity of the events, or a special intent—
elements that are not required by international law. In the context of the U.S. war
in Afghanistan, these findings suggest that the use of war crimes terminology
triggers emotional biases because of the salient negative political meaning of this
term.

C. Legal
Judgment
Institution’s Favorability

Trump s

the

Issuing

In contrast to my initial hypothesis, the study was unable to detect significant
effects of the issuing institutions on the perceived fairness of the reports. This
result may be explained by the importance and salience of the legal judgment
effect. Given a counter-attitudinal legal judgment on such a “hot” topic, the
impact of source favorability was mitigated. Another alternative explanation is that
the institution treatment was too subtle and not salient enough to trigger attitude
change. Lastly, perhaps neither institution was trusted enough to trigger attitude
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See generally David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 229
(2006).
Id. at 246.
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change. It could be the case that to disseminate counter-attitudinal facts
successfully, the information must come from an institution that enjoys broad
approval and public confidence, or perhaps a trusted individual. Future studies
should further explore the circumstances under which institutional legitimacy
effectively mitigates individuals’ tendency to reject facts that are inconsistent with
their prior beliefs.

D. Exploring Alternatives to Legal Di scourse
Experiment II demonstrated that legal discourse is ineffective in mobilizing
for domestic condemnation and sanctioning of in-group offenders. It also
suggested that a moral discourse may do a better job of influencing attitudes. The
manipulation I used here was very subtle: I only replaced the word “law” with the
word “moral.” The conclusion itself was still constructed in a very “legalistic”
structure. I did not mention the victims, did not use photos, videos, poems, or
other emotion-triggering manipulations. The finding that moral discourse is more
effective than legal discourse in influencing attitudes on war crimes is powerful,
because it demonstrates that even when keeping the technical and formalistic
structure of legal reports––and the exact same standards––individuals are more
likely to be influenced by the report and to express empathy to the out-group
victims when we frame the findings as moral, rather than legal. True, the effect
size was quite small. But the fact that it mattered at all is remarkable, considering
the subtlety of the manipulation.
A possible explanation for this finding is the alienating effect of legal
discourse, and the perception of international law as a technical and marginalizing
tool that speaks only to a small group of experts. In contrast, moral arguments are
perceived as intuitive and inclusive, and encourage wider participation by society
members. As Martha Minow suggests, maybe “words by lawyers differ from
words by journalists” and artists, and maybe “the more intimate and yet more
widely accessible languages of literature and popular music lyrics may change
minds and prompt actions.”171 This study is only the beginning of an exploration
of the unique effects of the legalization of truth on individuals’ beliefs and
attitudes. In future studies, I will continue to explore alternatives to legal
discourse, and will measure their impact on attitudes and beliefs, including
empathy for out-group members. In the following section I suggest several
alternatives to existing structures that stem from these findings, as well as concrete
recommendations for future fact-finding efforts regarding the Kunduz hospital
bombing case.

171

Minow, supra note 140, at 1666, 1673.
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VI. R ECOMMENDATIONS : R EDESIGNING
I NTERNATIONAL F ACT -F INDING
The findings of the two experiments discussed in this Article, together with
the interdisciplinary literature presented above, suggest that the decision to center
international fact-finding efforts around legal discourse––including legal
judgment, terminology, and frame––may be counterproductive. My research
indicates that the legal judgment of the fact-finding report is likely to trigger
ideology-based belief polarization; that “hot” legal terminology tends to reduce the
perceived fairness of the report; and that the legal frame appears to be less effective
than the moral frame in influencing attitudes. Based on these findings,
international organizations, including the U.N., should rethink the use and design
of legal fact-finding missions. First, it is important to acknowledge the limitations
of legal fact-finding and to recognize its questionable efficacy in promoting its
objectives, mainly to produce and disseminate facts and mobilize domestic
support for accountability measures. Second, responding to these challenges
requires both reforming the goals, structures, and processes of international factfinding and systematically considering alternatives to this method, including
formal tribunals or collaborative measures. While this Article is mainly focused on
the unintended consequences of legal fact-finding and not on the potential
spectrum of alternative institutional choices, the following Section offers several
observations from an institutional design perspective, and proposes
recommendations to improve the design and outcomes of fact-finding bodies.
More work is needed to further explore the full range of alternatives to legal factfinding, to measure the social impact of these alternatives on attitudes and beliefs,
and to compare the relative pros and cons of each method, in comparison to legal
fact-finding.

A. International Fact-Finding Goals and Purposes
In developing a research agenda for studying the effectiveness of
international courts, Professor Yuval Shany proposed a goal-based approach to
evaluate international tribunals.172 Drawing on the work of the influential
sociologist Charles Perrow, Shany offered an analytical framework to organize and
prioritize institutional goals, by distinguishing between official and operational
goals and by analyzing the goals’ source (external or internal), hierarchical level
(ultimate ends or intermediate), and method of articulation (explicit, implicit, or
unstated).173 Building on Shany’s work, this Article suggests that organizations
should employ the goal-based analytical framework not only for evaluating the
172

Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L
L. 225, 270 (2012).
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effectiveness of international institutions (including fact-finding bodies), but
also—and more importantly—for selecting institutional designs. That is to say,
when designing an international fact-finding mission, the mandating organization
should define, clarify, and prioritize the goals and purposes of this mission. Based
on the mission’s main goals, alternative processes and structures should be
considered, matching goals to processes in order to maximize the mission’s
efficacy. Instead of adopting a “one size fits all” approach, international factfinding would benefit from careful consideration of alternative structures, and
from a learned process of tailoring concrete processes and structures to specific
goals.
As mentioned earlier, U.N. fact-finding missions have been established to
fulfill an array of goals and purposes, including creating a historical record,
encouraging domestic accountability, fostering reconciliation, and preventing
future abuses. The structure and processes of fact-finding in most of these cases
were similar: the missions adopted legal discourse and made nonbinding
recommendations. The experimental findings presented above suggest that legal
discourse may not be a suitable method to achieve some of these goals, including
creating and disseminating a unified historical record and promoting domestic
accountability: the legal judgment and legal terminology triggers cognitive and
emotional biases that prevent the creation of a collective historical narrative; and
the legal frame is less effective than a moral frame for mobilizing domestic support
for accountability measures (including penalizing offenders and reparations for
the victims). These findings suggest that the goals and processes of international
fact-finding should be better studied and understood, and support the creation of
a systematic framework to design fact-finding missions in order to increase their
positive social impact.
There are several reasons to support a goal-based approach for the design
of international fact-finding. International fact-finding missions do not enjoy the
formal documentation and organizational sophistication inherent to other
international institutions. They do not have charters, statutes, or rules of
procedure and evidence to turn to for guidance. Their mandates are often crafted
hastily, while atrocities are ongoing, without identifying and prioritizing concrete
goals.174 Without clarifying the goals and purposes of fact-finding efforts, it is
174

For example, the UNHRC established a fact-finding mission to investigate operation “Cast Lead,”
a 22-day attack on the Gaza Strip by Israeli forces, in response to Hamas rocket attacks on southern
Israel. The resolution establishing the fact-finding mission was made while the hostilities continued,
and included a condemnation of Israel’s “massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian
people.” The resolution further instructed the mission’s members to “investigate all violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the occupying Power, Israel,
against the Palestinian people.” UNHRC Res. A/HRC/S-9/1 (Jan. 12, 2009), available at
https://perma.cc/QV69-KQJY. When Justice Richard Goldstone was later appointed as the head
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difficult to systematically consider alternative processes and structures, and to
choose, from a variety of options, those most suitable to promote the mission’s
goals. Moreover, lack of clarity concerning the mission’s goals encourages the
adoption of existing or familiar structures, without proper consideration of the
appropriateness of these structures to the current situation or the existence of
alternative structures.
For example, the decision of the Human Rights Council to dispatch a factfinding mission to the Central African Republic (CAR) was short and laconic,
stating only that the Council requests the High Commissioner “to submit to the
Human Rights Council, at its twenty-fourth session, an interim report on the
human rights situation in the Central African Republic.”175 In response, the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights deployed, from June 20 to July 11, 2013,
a fact-finding mission to the CAR to collect information on human rights
violations committed in Bangui and other localities between December 2012 and
July 2013. The mission interpreted the vague mandate to “submit a report on the
human rights situation” as directed at legal discourse and accountability, and,
accordingly, submitted a legal report analyzing the applicable law and finding both
parties responsible for gross human rights violations and, possibly, war crimes.176
Neither of these documents—the mandating resolution or the final report—
mentioned the goals of this process or reasons to adopt a legal analysis, given the
mission’s lack of any enforcement capabilities. From the materials available, it
seems that this structure was adopted as a default solution, without discussing the
purposes of dispatching this mission and without considering alternative
structures and processes. This goal ambiguity harms fact-finding efforts, as it
encourages practices that are not necessarily productive; it impedes attempts to
direct the policy direction ex ante, and to assess the mechanism's effectiveness ex
post.
Another reason to support a goal-based approach to the design of
international fact-finding missions is that even when goals are mentioned in the
mandating process they are often mixed, sometimes conflicting. The documents

175

176

of this fact-finding mission, he immediately demanded to change the mission’s mandate to
“investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that
might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were
conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before,
during or after.” Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UNHRC 13
(2009) [hereinafter: Goldstone Report], https://perma.cc/3K9A-C7GX. Another example is the more
recent UNHCR resolution establishing a fact-finding mission to investigate human rights abuses in
Burundi. See UNHRC Res. S-24/1, supra note 40.
UNHRC, RES. A/HRC/RES/23/18, Technical Assistance to the Central African Republic in the
Field of Human Rights (June 27, 2013).
UNHRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Central African Republic, A/HRC/24/59 (Sept. 12, 2013).
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concerning the U.N. Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB), for
example, mention several goals and purposes for the investigation, including
“preventing further deterioration of the human rights situation,” making
recommendations “on the improvement of the human rights situation” in
Burundi, assisting reconciliation efforts, ensuring “accountability for human rights
violations and abuses, including by identifying alleged perpetrators,” adopting
“appropriate transitional justice measures,” and issuing a final report and
participating in an enhanced interactive dialogue on the human rights situation in
Burundi.177 While all of these goals are valuable and important, it seems unlikely
that a fact-finding mission could accomplish them all at the same time, relying on
a single structure. A tension exists, for example, between the desire to promote
accountability by identifying and prosecuting responsible individuals and the
desire to prevent future abuses and to promote reconciliation, which can
sometimes be achieved only by promising powerful leaders full or partial
amnesty.178 Some transitional justice measures indeed promote truth and
reconciliation processes, in which participants are promised immunity from
prosecution in return for their detailed account of what happened.
Christof Heyns, U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions and member of the UNIIB, highlighted another goal––the
determination of undisputed facts––stating that “it is crucial to ascertain [the
disputed facts] in an indisputable manner.”179 As the theoretical framework and the
experimental findings described above demonstrate, determining facts in an
indisputable manner is probably not a productive way to think about the process
of truth-telling and truth-seeking concerning intense social controversies.
Moreover, the desire to present facts as indisputable may conflict with
reconciliation efforts, which are often based on narrative or restorative
approaches to truth––rather than on binary legal discourse––embracing the
coexistence of conflicting narratives and different descriptions or experiences of
the same events. Additionally, thinking of determining facts in an indisputable way
raises another challenge, as it relates to two separate goals: determining the facts,
and disseminating these facts successfully to a variety of heterogeneous sub-groups.
To achieve this dual goal, documenting abuses is not enough; it is just as important
to contribute to the creation of a shared narrative. As this Article demonstrates,
the processes and structures adopted to find the truth inevitably influence the
persuasive power of these facts and determine the success or failure of their
177
178
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UNHRC Res. S-24/1, supra note 40.
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute Systems Design and Transitional Justice, 14 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 289, 292 (2009); see also JANE E. STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?:
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 253 (2006).
Oral update by Christof Heyns, U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Member of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB), on the Enhanced Interactive
Dialogue on Burundi, UNHRC at 4 (Mar. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/9J4H-E3JM (emphasis added).
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dissemination. Since different aspects of the legal discourse (including judgment
and terminology) trigger cognitive and emotional biases and selective information
processing, successful dissemination of facts could potentially benefit from a
different approach to fact-finding and truth. The following Section will suggest
some alternative approaches.

B. Alternatives to Legal Discourse
The popularity of legal discourse in the context of fact-finding should not
be mistaken as a force of nature. Instead, it should be understood as what it is: a
choice; a social structure that constructs a specific interpretation of reality. As Jack
Balkin points out, “law’s truth is not the only truth, and law’s vision of reality is
not the only reality. Law’s power to enforce its vision of the world can clash with
other practices of knowledge, and with other forms of truth.”180 “There are many
other forms of knowledge acquisition in the world, and many other conventions
through which people try to determine what is true or false, try to gather and
assess knowledge.”181 In his canonic book, What is History, Edward Carr explains
that history is a “continuous process of interaction between the historian and his
facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past.” 182 Unlike historymaking, the traditional criminal legal process is final and binary. The judgment can
be either incriminating or absolving, not both. Conflicting narratives cannot coexist. This unavoidable affirmation of one narrative and rejection of others
triggers, as explained earlier, cognitive bias and rejection or distortion of
information.
To overcome some of these unintended consequences of legal discourse and
to provide a more inclusive and nuanced account of what happened, other types
of discourse can be adopted, promoting different interpretations of “truth.” While
exploring the broad range of potential discourses and the types of realities or
“truths” that they produce is beyond the scope of this Article, I will mention just
a few alternatives, adopted by other transitional justice mechanisms in the past.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, included
four different types of “truth” in its fact-finding processes: a forensic truth, focused
on the objective, physical, information; a narrative truth, focused on the personal
stories and experiences of individuals––both victims and perpetrators––and on
creation of united, restored memories; a social truth, established through
“interaction, discussion and debate;” and a healing/restorative truth, enabled through
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Jack M. Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 (2003).
Id. at 11.
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public acknowledgment and common memories of the events.183 The medical and
psychological literature has also revealed the potential contribution of this broader
understanding of truth for therapy;184 and socio-psychological research has
demonstrated that third parties can potentially play a valuable role in the process
of reevaluating social narratives and beliefs.185
While courts of law must rely on legal discourse and cannot escape making
final and binary determinations based on legal judgment, terminology, and frame,
international fact-finding efforts may, in some circumstances, benefit from
considering other types of discourse, depending on the primary goals of the
mission.186 A broader, non-legalistic interpretation of truth, such as a narrative,
social, or restorative truth,187 may be better suited to contribute to a collective
narrative of contested events, create a “shared history,” and disseminate otherwise
threatening facts.
Additionally, legal discourse, especially in the context of criminal law and
accountability, is focused on individualized blame.188 While individualizing guilt
serves several purposes, it has its own problems and dangers. As Barbara Fried
points out, “we have gotten nothing from our 40-year blame fest except the
guilty pleasure of reproaching others for acts that, but for the grace of God,
or luck, or social or biological forces, we might well have committed
ourselves.” 189 Discussing the South African Truth and Reconciliation
183

184

185

186

187
188
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Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE
MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 141–57, 151–53 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds.,
2000).
Alan W. Schefin, Narrative Truth, Historical Truth, and Forensic Truth, in THE MENTAL HEALTH
PRACTITIONER AND THE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 299–328, 302–304 (Lawrence E.
Lifson & Robert I. Simon eds., 1998).
Daniel Bar-Tal, From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis,
21 POL. PSYCHOL. 351, 361 (2000). Others found that “third-party activities to open or maintain
lines of communication [ ] are the most consistently effective conflict management techniques for
preventing escalation.” William J. Dixon, Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and
Promoting Peaceful Settlement, 50 INT’L ORG. 653, 671 (1996).
Marco Sassòli, for example, advised the international community to avoid using international
criminal law as an alibi for failing to engage in cooperative and diplomatic efforts to resolve the
conflict itself. Marco Sassòli, The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and Inherent
Challenges, 10 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 45, 55 (2007).
Boraine, supra note 183, at 151–53.
See generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2010); Payam
Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L
L. 7, 10 (2001) (“Beyond retribution and the moral impulse to vindicate humanitarian norms,
individual accountability for massive crimes is an essential part of a preventive strategy and, thus, a
realistic foundation for a lasting peace.”).
Barbara H. Fried, Beyond Blame: Would We Be Better Off in a World Without Blame?, BOSTON REV. (June
28, 2013), https://perma.cc/A7VA-9NFZ.

138

Vol. 18 No. 1

The Legalization of Truth

Krebs

Commission, Gibson argued that promoting an alternative of “shared blame”
was the single most important characteristic of the South African truth and
reconciliation process.190 As he explains, “sharing responsibility, blame, and
victimhood creates a common identity, which can provide a basis for dialogue. If
people are no longer dogmatically attached to a ‘good versus evil’ view of the
struggle, then perhaps a space for reconciliation is opened.”191 Replacing the
criminal legal discourse of individualized guilt with a social discourse of “shared
blame” could potentially alleviate the binary legal discourse of guilt/innocence
into a constructive social discourse supporting reconciliation.
Alternatively, the scientific and medical literature has challenged the
criminalization of human errors and the culture of blame altogether.192 In his
book, Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability, Sidney Dekker concludes that
the threat of judicial involvement is enough to prevent people from coming
forward with information about an incident that they were involved in.193 Judicial
involvement, he argues, “can engender a climate of fear and silence,” in which “it
can be difficult, if not impossible, to get access to information that may be critical
to finding out” what happened and to prevent similar errors in the future.194
Others found, similarly, that cultures of blame––intensified by lawyers and the
media––can lead individuals and organizations to blame others rather than take
responsibility for the error and thereby explore and create solutions to address the
error or problem.195
Therefore, official policy-making bodies and experts in medical and human
error have called for a shift in perspective to a blame-free culture within medicine,
predicated on the basis that errors are largely attributable to systems rather than
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individuals.196 While, arguably, healthcare and aviation errors are different than
military ones, at least to some extent, an important similarity relates to the
psychological processes leading individuals to share information, to take
responsibility, and to find solutions and prevent repetition of the same errors time
and again.197 If criminalization and blame have indeed a detrimental effect on
willingness to report and disclose information, then we should be motivated to
explore blame-free alternatives to fact-finding, which could, potentially, motivate
individuals to share information and experiences openly.

C. The Kunduz Hospital Bombing:
Preventing Future Attacks

Finding

the

Facts,

Let us now return to the attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz. At the time
of this writing, both MSF and UNAMA, as well as several other human rights
organizations, continue to demand the establishment of a legalized fact-finding
mission to investigate the attack (or to task the existing IHFFC with this
responsibility).198 It seems that the international community has been trapped in
the misconception that legal fact-finding is the only method to resolve factual
controversies and mobilize for action. However, as this Article demonstrates, legal
discourse is ineffective in realizing both. Applying the previous discussion to the
case of the Kunduz hospital airstrike, I make the following suggestions and
observations:
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Molly E. Collins et al., On the Prospects for a Blame-Free Medical Culture, 69 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1287,
1289–90 (2009). See also Richard T. Penson et al., Medical Mistakes: a Workshop on Personal Perspectives,
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First, prioritizing goals and purposes: what is more important––finding out what
happened, or determining who is responsible? Prosecuting those involved, or
implementing long-term institutional changes? Of course, it is possible to envisage
a combination of goals to be pursued in a single case. However, clarifying and
prioritizing these goals would be helpful in deciding which structures and
processes would best fit the particular situation. Based on MSF’s communications,
reports, and demands, it seems that the organization’s main goal is not
individualized prosecutions and adjudication, but rather finding out what really
happened––what caused the U.S. military to mistakenly identify a hospital as a
military target, and accordingly to attack it. It seeks a way to determine and
disseminate facts successfully, reconciling conflicting accounts concerning what
happened.199
Second, identifying alternatives to legal discourse: if, indeed, the main goals of the
fact-finding efforts are determining and disseminating facts and producing an
agreed-upon record of events, as well as preventing future breaches of the
protections accorded to medical objects, the adoption of legal discourse might be
counter-productive. The binary legal judgment––assigning blame and
incriminating or absolving specific individuals––might stand in the way of
encouraging information dissemination and creating a shared understanding of
what happened. Legal discourse creates an adversarial approach to truth, in which
conflicting narratives clash and only one prevails. If, at the end of an international
fact-finding process, the MSF narrative prevails, it is conceivable that the U.S.
military would continue to reject this narrative, especially considering the
nonbinding nature and lack of enforcement capacities of fact-finding reports. If
the narrative of the U.S. military prevails, and the fact-finding body concludes that
the named individuals did not commit war crimes, these individualized findings
might mask broader systemic failures.
To find the truth and reconcile conflicting narratives, MSF should consider
forsaking its commitment to legal judgment and blame, which has detrimental
effects on willingness to report and disclose sensitive information concerning
erroneous risk assessments and organizational failures. Alternatively, an
organizational discourse, promoting a “learning from failure” approach, should
be considered, offering collaborative, blameless, fact-finding structures to
motivate information sharing and disclosure, as well as organizational reform. 200
Additionally, an organizational discourse would shift the focus of attention from
issues relating to individual criminal responsibility to broader social processes,
including organizational culture, decision-making processes, and structural biases
199
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leading to erroneous risk assessments, which may better account for some of the
failures leading to the attack on the MSF hospital. While analyzing the effects of
various alternatives to legal discourse, including an organizational discourse, is
outside the scope of this Article, the literature surveyed here testifies to the
potential of such alternative discourses in instigating better practices of
information sharing and organizational change.

VII. C AVEATS AND F UTURE R ESEARCH
Experimental methods have unique value for studying the efficacy of legal
institutions. By randomly assigning treatments, the researcher is able to control
the data-generation process and to estimate the influence of a specific intervention
on an outcome.201 Nonetheless, this method is not without flaws.
First, this Article demonstrates that individuals respond in different ways to
new information, depending on their national, social, cultural, and political
affiliations. Therefore, the findings of the experiments described in this Article are
limited to the social groups that were included in the experiments, mainly
American nationals. It is possible that different social groups hold different beliefs
and respond differently to international law and international institutions. To
support a more inclusive and generalizable argument concerning the impact of
international law on domestic attitudes, these hypotheses must be tested using
representative samples of other nations. In future articles, I will report the results
of similar experiments fielded in other countries.202 These comparative
experiments will enable a comparison of the impact of international fact-finding
reports on public beliefs and attitudes in different societies.
Second, the findings of the experiments described in this Article are also
limited to the specific situation which was chosen for the vignette: a small-scale
war crime, which could lead to different legal and moral conclusions. While this
scenario was carefully chosen to represent a real-life, believable situation, allowing
subjects to reach their own judgments and to reduce social desirability bias, other
situations could result in different outcomes. Future research should test the
impact of international law on domestic attitudes when in-group offenders are
blamed for genocide or other grave violations of international law.
Third, Experiment I specifically measured the impact of “war crimes”
terminology on the perceived credibility of fact-finding reports. This wording was
chosen to represent realistic use of this legal term, as it frequently appears in
international fact-finding reports. The term represents “hot” legal terminology
201
202

Chilton & Tingley, supra note 24, at 178. See also Broude, supra note 23, at 1103, 1133–34.
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2017, and additional experiments are currently planned to be fielded during 2017-2018 in Australia
and potentially Canada and the U.K., to measure differences in legal culture toward international
law, as well as levels of national identity and threat.
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with negative moral value. While the experiment successfully demonstrates the
negative impact this specific term has on the perceived fairness of fact-finding
reports, the results may also be motivated by remedial deterrence (or solution
aversion). That is to say, the severe legal and moral implications stemming from
war crimes accusations may motivate subjects to discredit the information
altogether or refuse to sanction the offenders. Additionally, the discrepancy
between the legal and political meanings of the term “war crimes” could have
influenced some participants to respond negatively to the treatment simply
because they thought the described events are not grave enough to be considered
“war crimes.” To test the exact mechanism or reason for the negative effect found
in this experiment––whether it resulted from an identity-based bias, solution
aversion, or discrepancy between the legal and political meaning of war crimes—
more research should be conducted, varying the gravity of the crimes, as well as
the anticipated sanction.
Fourth, individuals typically receive this type of information from the media.
A more realistic scenario would have presented the information to the research
subjects as a news article. However, research shows that the specific media outlet
conveying the information influences perceived credibility and assessments of
new information. Even without mentioning the specific outlet, subjects’ authentic
reactions to the report might be contaminated with their views of the “media.”
Therefore, I decided to use a direct “quote” of the executive summary of the
report rather than a news article reporting its main finding. This design choice
allowed me to isolate subjects’ reactions to the report rather than mix it with media
bias.
Finally, public opinion or domestic attitudes are not necessarily a proxy for
policy or behavioral changes. This is particularly true in non-democratic states,
but is also relevant for democracies. Having said that, this Article specifically tests
domestic attitudes because I believe these are particularly important for
international fact-finding efforts. Increasingly, with the development of social
media and alternative information channels, social sub-groups hold conflicting
beliefs concerning physical events. How many people were killed? What was the
cause of death? Were the victims militants or civilians? And based on different
assessments of what actually happened, individuals form opinions on specific
responses to the relevant events, but also on the conflict, its roots, the enemy, and
possible solutions. Regardless of potential policy or behavioral outcomes, I argue
that domestic attitudes on war crimes matter because they serve as societal
foundations that preserve and even intensify conflicts. And it is our duty to design
institutions that can potentially mitigate, rather than intensify, this problem.
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VIII. C ONCLUSION
War crimes investigations are intended, among other things, to assert and
disseminate the truth and to prevent future atrocities. Unfortunately, modern
international fact-finding missions adopt legal discourse to construct and interpret
facts, and this discourse tends to trigger cognitive and emotional biases which may
frustrate attempts to achieve these exact goals. An adversarial, binary, legaljudgment-approach to truth might frustrate attempts at resolving factual
controversies and disseminate threatening information. “Hot” legal terminology,
such as “war crimes,” might trigger a defensive reaction or rejection of
information and decrease the perceived fairness of the report. A legal frame fails
to influence domestic attitudes or to mobilize support for sanctions and
reparations. The choice to ascertain and disseminate truth using legal discourse is
not without benefits––it provides legal rules, terminology, and conventions to
structure and guide the production of facts and the construction of meaning.
However, at the same time, it triggers cognitive and emotional biases that frustrate
efforts to disseminate controversial information and to resolve factual disputes;
and it lacks the emotional appeal, participatory value, and social cues that moral
expressions or other types of social truth-telling entail.
The data reported here suggest that sometimes more information means less
shared knowledge: while opposing social and political groups could potentially
agree on factual findings such as numbers of victims or the timeframe of a military
attack, the adoption of binary legal judgment and politicized legal terminology
contributes to a bitter divide in public opinion concerning war crimes. Ironically,
the tendency to turn to legal discourse to achieve factual accuracy and
accountability triggers social dynamics that frustrate both objectives. In order to
have a stronger, more robust, persuasive value, fact-finding missions should
rethink their focus on legal discourse and consider replacing it with other, more
socially-oriented forms of truth-telling and communication. By widening the
corpus of relevant facts, by restructuring the boundaries of what is true or false,
and by accepting the potential co-existence of conflicting narratives, fact-finding
mechanisms may be able to dismantle some of the biases and distortion, and to
accomplish their goals.

144

Vol. 18 No. 1

The Legalization of Truth

Krebs

IX. A PPENDICES
1. U.N. Fact-Finding Missions – Goal Dataset
Goals Legend/Coding (1=goal mentioned in the mission’s mandate,
0=goal not mentioned):
IL = Investigating International Law Violations
Fact = Establishing the Facts
Truth = Establishing the Truth
Prev = Preventing Future Atrocities
Rec = Promoting Reconciliation
Account = Promoting Accountability
Assist = Assisting Domestic Authorities

Summer 2017

145

Chicago Journal of International Law

146

Vol. 18 No. 1

The Legalization of Truth

Summer 2017

Krebs

147

Chicago Journal of International Law

2. Experiments’ Sampling and Demographics

(a) Matching and Weighting for experiment I:
YouGov interviewed 2251 respondents who were then matched down to a
sample of 2000 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a
sampling frame on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and
political interest. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full
2010 American Community Survey (ACS) sample with selection within strata by
weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use
file). Data on voter registration status and turnout were matched to this frame
using the November 2010 Current Population Survey.
Data on interest in politics and party identification were then matched to
this frame from the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey. The matched cases were
weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and
the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in
the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity,
years of education, and ideology. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles
of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to
these deciles.
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics (Experiment I)
Proportion/mean
Experimental treatments
Judgment
Incriminating legal judgment
War crimes judgment
Absolving legal judgment
Institution
United Nations
U.S. Military Court
U.S. Federal Court
Covariates
Ideology
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Gender (female)
Age

0.322
0.341
0.338
0.335
0.332
0.334
0.366
0.325
0.256
0.526
49 (s.d.=16.369,
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min=19, max=93)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Education
No high school education
High school education
College education (or partial)
Graduate education
Valid voter registration status

0.717
0.108
0.123
0.055
0.037
0.345
0.511
0.108
0.876

(b) Matching and Weighting for experiment II:
YouGov interviewed 1152 respondents who were then matched down to a
sample of 1000 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched on
gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest.
YouGov then weighted the matched set of survey respondents to known
characteristics of the general population of the United States from the 2010
American Community Survey and 2012 Current Population Survey.
Table 2. Sample Descriptive Statistics (Experiment II)
Proportion/mean
Experimental treatments
Judgment/framing
Incriminating legal judgment
Absolving legal judgment
Incriminating moral judgment
Absolving moral judgment
Control
Covariates
Ideology
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Gender (female)
Age
Summer 2017

149

0.199
0.206
0.213
0.197
0.185

0.348
0.3
0.265
0.52
47 (s.d.=16.998,
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min=18, max=93)
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Education
No high school education
High school education
College education (or partial)
Graduate education
Valid voter registration status

0.721
0.111
0.111
0.057
0.055
0.377
0.482
0.085
0.865

3. Vignettes and Questionnaires

(a) Experiment I:
Each respondent was randomly assigned into one of 9 treatment groups,
based on 2 randomized variables:
1.
Institution_rand: the United Nations, a U.S. Military Court or a
U.S. Federal Court
2.
Judgment_rand: The U.S. Marines did not violate international law,
the U.S. Marines violated international law or the U.S. Marines
committed war crimes.
First, respondents read the following paragraph:
The following questions are about a military operation in Afghanistan that
happened a few months ago. Initially, it was unclear how many people died, and
whether they were Al-Qaeda members or innocent civilians.
Therefore, the institution_rand appointed a team of experts to investigate.
The summary of their report includes 2 parts (which are reprinted on the next 2
screens): in the first part the investigators give their account of what happened
(the facts of the case). In the second part the investigators give their legal
judgment of these facts, concluding that the United States judgment_rand.
Please read both parts carefully. Afterwards, we will ask for your opinions about
each part of the report.
Second, the respondents read the two parts of the fact-finding report:
[Insert UN1/MC1/CC1 here]
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New Screen
[Insert UN2/UN3/UN4/MC2/MC3/MC4/CC2/CC3/CC4 here]
Third, the respondents were asked to answer the following questions:
“The investigation was conducted because the facts of this case were highly
contested (especially how many people were killed, and whether they were AlQaeda members or innocent civilians).
Therefore, we want to know your opinion on the credibility of the facts
determined by the investigators (the description of what happened, including the
finding that 4 unarmed Afghan civilians were killed by the Marines):
Do you think that the facts summarized by the investigators are –
1

Completely inaccurate

2

Mostly inaccurate

3

Somewhat inaccurate

4

Somewhat accurate

5

Mostly accurate

6

Completely accurate

In your opinion, were the facts presented by the investigators –
1

Completely biased

2

Mostly biased

3

Somewhat biased

4

Somewhat objective

5

Mostly objective

6

Completely objective

New Screen
Now we want your opinion on the investigators' legal judgment of the events
(determining that the United States did not violate international law/violated
international law/committed war crimes).
In your opinion, was the investigators’ judgment –
1

Completely biased

2

Mostly biased

3

Somewhat biased
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4

Somewhat objective

5

Mostly objective

6

Completely objective

New screen
Based on the summary of the report, we now want to know your opinion on the
full report.
In your opinion, was the investigators' report –
1

Completely unfair

2

Mostly unfair

3

Somewhat unfair

4

Somewhat fair

5

Mostly fair

6

Completely fair

New screen
Now we want to know your personal opinion on the events.
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
“The U.S. Marines did the best they could under the circumstances.”
1

Disagree strongly

2

Disagree somewhat

3

Disagree slightly

4

Agree slightly

5

Agree somewhat

6

Agree strongly

New screen
“The U.S. Marines should be prosecuted.”
1

Disagree strongly

2

Disagree somewhat

3

Disagree slightly

4

Agree slightly
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Fourth, after completing the survey, the respondents were given various tasks related to other
issues (such as education reforms). After about 10 minutes of unrelated assignments,
respondents were asked the following two attitudinal questions:
What is your opinion of the institution_rand?
1

Very favorable

2

Somewhat favorable

3

Somewhat unfavorable

4

Very unfavorable

5

Don’t know / Never heard of it

New Screen
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
"Patriots should support America even if it is in the wrong"
1

Disagree strongly

2

Disagree somewhat

3

Agree somewhat

4

Agree strongly
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UN1 (similar to MC1 and CC1, the only difference being the institution’s
name and symbol):
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UN2 (similar to MC2 and CC2, the only difference being the institution’s
name and symbol):
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UN3 (similar to MC3 and CC3, the only difference being the institution’s
name and symbol):
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UN4 (similar to MC4 and CC4, the only difference being the institution’s
name and symbol):
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(b) Experiment II:
Each respondent was randomly assigned into one of 4 treatment groups or
a control group, based on 2 randomized variables:
1.
Framing_rand: international law standards or universal moral
standards.
2.
Judgment_rand: The US Marines did not violate or violated the
framing_rand.
3.
Control group subjects read the same facts as everybody else, but
did not receive any judgment (condemning or absolving, legal or
moral).
First, respondents read the following paragraph:
The following questions are about a military operation in Afghanistan which
happened a few months ago. Initially, it was unclear how many people died, and
whether they were Al-Qaeda members or innocent civilians.
Therefore, a team of international experts was asked to investigate.
The summary of their report is reprinted on the next screen. In their
summary, the investigators give their account of what happened (the facts of the
case).
The summary of their report includes 2 parts (which are reprinted on the
next 2 screens): in the first part the investigators give their account of what
happened (the facts of the case). In the second part the investigators give their legal
judgment of these facts, concluding that judgment_rand [control group subjects
read a similar paragraph that only mentioned the first part of the report].
Please read the report's summary carefully. Afterwards, we will ask for your
opinion about it.
Nangar Khel (Afghanistan) Report:
Summary of the Facts
On August 4, 2013, a member of Al-Qaeda exploded a bomb near a U.S.
Marine base in the Nangar Kahel region in Afghanistan, killing a U.S. Marine.
Three Marines, who witnessed the explosion, chased the attacker into a
nearby marketplace. They shot their guns repeatedly until they killed the attacker.
Four Afghans who were near the shooting were also killed from the
gunshots, and nine others were wounded. The Marines said they saw weapons and
thought these people were Al-Qaeda members. After examining the evidence, the
investigators concluded that these people were unarmed civilians.
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New screen
Second, respondents in the treatment groups read one of the following 4 treatments [2X2
design]:
Nangar Khel (Afghanistan) Report (continued):
Summary of the Legal Conclusions
According to international law (including the Geneva Conventions), soldiers
are obligated to exercise reasonable care to protect civilians during armed conflict.
(1) Incriminating judgment, legal framing:
Having investigated the facts of the case, the investigators concluded that
the U.S. Marines violated this legal standard and that the United States is,
therefore, legally responsible for the death and injury of these civilians.
(2) Absolving judgment, legal framing:
Having investigated the facts of the case, the investigators concluded that
the US Marines did not violate this legal standard and that the United States is,
therefore, not legally responsible for the death and injury of these civilians.
(3) Incriminating judgment, moral framing:
Having investigated the facts of the case, the investigators concluded that
the US Marines violated this moral standard and that the United States is,
therefore, morally responsible for the death and injury of these civilians.
(4) Absolving judgment, moral framing:
Having investigated the facts of the case, the investigators concluded that
the US Marines did not violate this moral standard and that the United States is,
therefore, not morally responsible for the death and injury of these civilians.
Third, the respondents were asked to answer the following questions:
The investigation was conducted because the facts of this case were highly
contested (especially how many people were killed, and whether they were AlQaeda members or innocent civilians).
Therefore, we want to know your opinion on the credibility of the facts
determined by the investigators (the description of what happened):
Do you think that the facts summarized by the investigators are –
1

Completely inaccurate
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2

Mostly inaccurate

3

Somewhat inaccurate

4

Somewhat accurate

5

Mostly accurate

6

Completely accurate

In your opinion, were the facts presented by the investigators –
1

Completely biased

2

Mostly biased

3

Somewhat biased

4

Somewhat objective

5

Mostly objective

6

Completely objective

New screen
Now we want your opinion on the investigators' legal/moral judgment of
the events (determining that judgment_rand).
In your opinion, was the investigators’ judgment –
1

Completely biased

2

Mostly biased

3

Somewhat biased

4

Somewhat objective

5

Mostly objective

6

Completely objective

New screen
Based on the summary of the report, we now want to know your opinion on
the full report.
In your opinion, was the investigators' report –
1

Completely unfair

2

Mostly unfair

3

Somewhat unfair

4

Somewhat fair
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Mostly fair

6

Completely fair
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New screen
Now we want to know your personal opinion on the events.
Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements:
“The U.S. Marines did the best they could under the circumstances.”
1

Disagree strongly

2

Disagree somewhat

3

Disagree slightly

4

Agree slightly

5

Agree somewhat

6

Agree strongly

“The U.S. Marines should be prosecuted.”
1

Disagree strongly

2

Disagree somewhat

3

Disagree slightly

4

Agree slightly

5

Agree somewhat

6

Agree strongly

“The U.S. Government should compensate the Afghan victims.”
1

Disagree strongly

2

Disagree somewhat

3

Disagree slightly

4

Agree slightly

5

Agree somewhat

6

Agree strongly

Summer 2017

161

Chicago Journal of International Law

4. Summary of Treatment Effects

(a) Experiment I:
Table 3. Summary of Treatment Effects: Mean Report Fairness, by Treatment Groups
and Ideology

Table reports the means of the Report Fairness, by Institution, Judgment and
Ideology, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses, N= 1,995.
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(b) Experiment II:
Table 4. Summary of Treatment Effects: Mean Willingness to Prosecute the Soldiers, by
Treatment Groups and Ideology

Table reports the means of Willingness to Prosecute, by Treatment and
Ideology, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses, N= 998.
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